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Abstract
Historically, livestock and poultry diseases have been introduced into new areas by the uncontrolled
importation of animals and trade (including smuggling), through the movements of people and wildlife, and
by vectors. Some diseases spread widely in the past. Rinderpest or “cattle plague,” for example, devastated
farms as it was transported across continents by invading armies and their cattle, as well as by trade, the
development of railways, and other factors. Other pathogens remained fairly localized for various reasons.
Most of the parasites that cause African animal trypanosomiasis, for instance, must be transmitted by tsetse
flies, and these insects have not become established outside the “tsetse fly belt” of Africa. As livestock
production became more sophisticated, countries with sufficient resources set up border controls and
surveillance to prevent the introduction of new diseases. Many nations have also eradicated serious diseases
such as classical swine fever, highly virulent Newcastle disease, foot and mouth disease, glanders, and bovine
babesiosis. However, some countries do not have the resources or the veterinary infrastructure for such
efforts. In these areas, diseases that are exotic to the rest of the world remain a persistent problem, causing
illness and deaths among animals, loss of productivity, and in some cases, human disease. Through
international travel, livestock trade, and other routes, such agents can be accidentally reintroduced to nations
that have become disease free.
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CHAPTER 5
Historically, livestock and poultry diseases have been introduced 
into new areas by the uncontrolled importation of animals and 
trade (including smuggling), through the movements of people 
and wildlife, and by vectors. Some diseases spread widely in 
the past. Rinderpest or “cattle plague,” for example, devastated 
farms as it was transported across continents by invading 
armies and their cattle, as well as by trade, the development 
of railways, and other factors. Other pathogens remained 
fairly localized for various reasons. Most of the parasites that 
cause African animal trypanosomiasis, for instance, must be 
transmitted by tsetse flies, and these insects have not become 
established outside the “tsetse fly belt” of Africa. As livestock 
production became more sophisticated, countries with 
sufficient resources set up border controls and surveillance to 
prevent the introduction of new diseases. Many nations have 
also eradicated serious diseases such as classical swine fever, 
highly virulent Newcastle disease, foot and mouth disease, 
glanders, and bovine babesiosis. However, some countries do 
not have the resources or the veterinary infrastructure for such 
efforts. In these areas, diseases that are exotic to the rest of the 
world remain a persistent problem, causing illness and deaths 
among animals, loss of productivity, and in some cases, human 
disease. Through international travel, livestock trade, and other 
routes, such agents can be accidentally reintroduced to nations 
that have become disease free. 
Poultry can be infected with avian influenza or Newcastle disease through  
contact with wild birds. Source: Jane Galyon, Iowa State University
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All countries, including the United States and Canada, 
periodically experience outbreaks of exotic or emerging 
diseases. Some incidents are limited to one or a few cases, 
and are quickly controlled. Others involve massive outbreaks 
that take months or even years to resolve. In the worst case 
scenario, an exotic disease can become established or re-
established in a country. The effects of some epizootics on a 
nation’s animal populations and economy may be devastating. 
This chapter describes some outbreaks of foreign animal 
diseases that have occurred in various countries, their impact, 
the control measures taken, and the success or failure of the 
eradication efforts. These descriptions illustrate the potential 
scope of disease outbreaks, the variety of measures taken for 
their control, and the diversity of sources from which an agent 
may be introduced. 
Foot and Mouth Disease
in the United Kingdom 
One of the most devastating epidemics in the last 10 years 
was a foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak that occurred 
in the United Kingdom in 2001. Although it is not a life-
threatening disease in most adult animals, FMD can cause 
suffering from oral and foot vesicles and erosions. It also 
results in major economic and trading difficulties for infected 
countries. Because FMD virus can spread on fomites as well 
as in inapparently infected animals, it can sweep through a 
country rapidly in spite of control measures. The 2001 FMD 
outbreak illustrates how a FAD spread widely in a country 
with a veterinary infrastructure similar to that of the U.S. and 
Canada, as well as how the international community reacted 
to the outbreak. 
How it Began
On February 19, 2001, a veterinary inspector from the State 
Veterinary Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food (MAFF) was conducting routine inspections 
at an abattoir in Little Warley, Essex, and found vesicular 
lesions on 27 sows and one boar. Vesicles (skin blisters) are a 
characteristic sign of FMD, as well as of some other diseases 
such as vesicular stomatitis, swine vesicular disease, and 
vesicular exanthema of swine. In this case, laboratory tests 
confirmed the disease to be FMD. On February 20, MAFF 
announced an immediate “stop movement” of all susceptible 
livestock in the U.K., including the movement of animals to 
abattoirs, sale markets, and pastures.
Efforts to trace the disease back to the infected farm and 
suppress the outbreak began immediately. The infected pigs 
had arrived at the abattoir on February 16 from farms in 
Buckinghamshire and the Isle of Wight. They were traced back 
to a farm at Heddon-on-the-Wall, Northumberland. By the 
time the outbreak was discovered, FMD had spread to a cluster 
of holdings in the County of Essex through the movement of 
pigs, people, and fomites, and by localized airborne spread. 
Infected sheep from the farm at Heddon-on-the-Wall had 
also been moved to the Longtown market near Carlisle. Sheep 
often have minimal clinical signs when they are infected with 
FMD virus, and can spread the virus unnoticed. In the U.K., 
infected sheep transmitted the virus to other animals when 
they moved through markets, and these animals eventually 
spread the disease to thousands of additional sheep and cattle 
holdings in other parts of Great Britain. 
What is Foot and Mouth Disease?
FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that can affect 
all cloven-hoofed animals including cattle, swine, deer, 
goats, and sheep. It can also infect some other species such 
as hedgehogs, armadillos, kangaroos, capybaras, rats, and 
elephants. The FMD virus can be found in all secretions and 
excretions from acutely infected animals, which may begin 
shedding this virus before the onset of clinical signs. Many 
animals acquire the virus during close contact with infected 
animals, but it is also spread in aerosols and on fomites such 
as manure-contaminated tires, boots, and clothing. The 
disease is characterized by fever and vesicles found mainly in 
the mouth, nares, muzzle, feet, or teats. The vesicles break 
quickly to become painful erosions. Affected animals can 
be lame or refuse to eat, can salivate profusely, and may lose 
weight. Sheep and goats show very mild, if any, signs. Adult 
animals generally recover within a few weeks but secondary 
infections may lead to a longer recovery time. High mortality 
rates are sometimes seen in young animals.
How it Entered the U.K.
Seven immunologically distinct serotypes of the FMD virus 
are known to exist. The virus in the U.K. was identified as 
serotype “O” Pan-Asian. The strain involved in this outbreak 
was first recognized in India in 1990 and has since spread to 
a number of countries around the world. It is identical to the 
virus found in recent outbreaks in Africa, including one in 
South Africa where the virus was traced to pig swill—waste 
food from human tables—sold illegally from an Asian boat.
The source of the 2001 epizootic in the U.K. is thought to 
have been pig swill. The feeding of pig swill is a practice that 
has been going on for generations. Today, pig swill comes 
from restaurants, schools, and anywhere humans eat and 
waste food on a large scale. In recent years, the feeding of 
pig swill has declined because it is thought to be inefficient 
and outmoded. In 1998, a government panel of agricultural 
experts advised that it be banned; however, the advice was 
rejected by ministers who did not want to impose new costs 
on hard-pressed farmers. Only about 1 percent of producers 
in the U.K. were using pig swill at the time of the outbreak. 
Farmers are supposed to treat the swill by heating it to 100ºC 
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virus is believed to have reached the Netherlands via a 
shipment of veal calves from the Republic of Ireland. The 
calves were rested in an animal holding near La Barouche 
Gondouin for 12 hours, where they were apparently infected 
by sheep coming from the U.K. To fight the spread of FMD, 
European Union veterinarians in Brussels agreed to limited 
emergency vaccination in the Netherlands around infected 
farms and animals awaiting slaughter. This overturned the 15-
year E.U. policy of prohibiting vaccination for FMD.
In the U.K., the MAFF decided on March 15 to begin “ring 
depopulation.” In ring depopulation, all susceptible livestock 
within a specified radius of infected premises are killed, 
whether they are diagnosed with the disease or not. In this 
case, a ring was defined as three kilometers. A total of 251 
farms were infected at the time, and about a million healthy 
animals were scheduled to be culled. On March 20, FMD 
was found in the Republic of Ireland, near the infected farm 
(212ºF) to kill potential pathogens. MAFF officials suspect 
that the infectious swill originated as waste food from a ship 
or international restaurant that was not properly heat-treated.
The Spread
By March 2, FMD had spread to 40 locations, with many foci 
linked to infected markets. A total of 25,000 animals had been 
destroyed and incinerated on-farm. Cases were also confirmed 
in County Armagh in Northern Ireland. On March 9, at least 
127 locations were known to be affected. The MAFF sent 
information to farmers and veterinarians on how to avoid 
spreading FMD and how to report suspected outbreaks. It also 
publicized the details of the clinical signs in sheep, as the illness 
in this species can be subtle.
The U.K. soon developed a shortage of qualified “clean” 
veterinarians to investigate suspect farms. People may harbor 
the FMD virus in their nasal passages for a period of time, 
and investigators could not move rapidly from farm to 
farm due to the risk of transmitting the virus. At the start 
of the outbreak, MAFF veterinarians who had been on 
infected premises were required not to have contact with 
uninfected, susceptible animals for five days. Private practice 
veterinarians and government veterinarians from other 
nations were enlisted to help. The U.S. sent the first group 
of 20 veterinarians the week of March 5, and another 125 
individuals as the outbreak progressed. Canada contributed 
68 veterinary and para-professional personnel to support the 
U.K. response during the outbreak.
One month after the start of the outbreak, MAFF decreased 
the time required to become “clean” from five to three days to 
enable more veterinarians to investigate potentially infected 
premises. Out of necessity, the time required to become “clean” 
eventually decreased to 24 hours to visit a highly suspect farm.  
Veterinary teams for infected premises, surveillance, and trace  
back from sale markets were established to better utilize personnel.
The control measures established to stop FMD transmission 
resulted in a number of difficulties. Because animal 
movements were restricted, cows could not cross roads for 
milking or be moved to fresh grazing pastures. Pregnant ewes 
were prevented from moving to shelter for lambing. This 
resulted in intense public criticism and an outcry to allow 
some animal movement for welfare reasons. To reduce the 
transmission of the virus by humans, public footpaths were 
closed and the public was strongly discouraged from going 
anywhere near livestock farms. Carcass disposal also became a 
problem. The MAFF initially planned to render the carcasses 
of destroyed livestock rather than incinerate them on-farm. 
However, the large number of carcasses resulted in a lack of 
sealed trucks for hauling carcasses to rendering plants, delays 
in burial, and shortages of material for incineration. About 
one month after the start of the outbreak, the military became 
involved to coordinate the process.
Animals with foot and mouth disease develop vesicles and erosions on the 
mouth, muzzle, feet or teats. Cattle with oral lesions may drool profusely.
Source: Dr. Pam Hullinger, University of California, Davis
In spite of control measures, the epidemic continued to 
spread and cases began to appear outside the U.K. On 
March 13, FMD was confirmed at La Baroche-Gondouin 
in northwestern France. The infected farm was already in a 
movement control zone, put in place around a sheep farm 
that had imported animals from the U.K. two weeks earlier. 
The sheep had been preventively slaughtered at that time. 
Six cattle on the newly infected farm showed symptoms of 
FMD, and the entire herd of 114 cattle was destroyed. On 
March 21, FMD was also confirmed in four cows on a farm 
in the Netherlands. Temporary restrictions were imposed 
throughout the Netherlands on the movement of cattle, 
poultry, transport vehicles for cattle and poultry, and the 
semen, ova, and embryos of ungulates. All animals on the 
affected farm, as well as the animals on six farms within a one 
kilometer radius, were culled. The animals were either buried 
on the farm or burned. All farms within three kilometers of 
the affected farm were inspected for signs of FMD. The FMD 
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that has been found earlier in Northern Ireland and within 
its surveillance zone. On March 30, there were 60 new foci of 
infection in the U.K., the highest daily total of the epidemic 
so far. By that time, 839 infected premises had been identified 
altogether. The farming and tourism industries had been 
devastated, and even politics was affected. On April 2, Prime 
Minister Tony Blair announced that the general election 
scheduled for May 3 would be delayed until June 7 because 
of the FMD crisis. Eventually, the severe control measures 
succeeded in controlling the epidemic. By June 12 the spread 
had slowed; only four new locations were found that day, 
bringing the total number of new foci to 1,736. By this time, 
over three million animals had been slaughtered, and 8,334 
premises had been affected. 
The last case of FMD was reported on September 30, 2001, 
bringing the total number of confirmed cases in the U.K. to 
2,030. Many more animals had been killed to prevent the 
spread of the disease. According to official U.K. government 
figures, more than four million animals were culled. Unofficial 
figures from the Meat and Livestock Commission put the 
number of animals slaughtered at more than 10 million. 
Those figures include animals slaughtered for welfare reasons 
such as dwindling feed and space, animals killed because 
there was no market for them, and animals killed with 
their mothers and only counted as one animal. On January 
22, 2002, the OIE declared that the U.K. had regained its 
previously recognized FMD-free status without vaccination, 
clearing the way for international export trade in animals and 
animal products. With the exception of a limited outbreak in 
2007, caused by a laboratory accident, the U.K. has remained 
FMD-free since that time.
The International Reaction
The U.K. was required to notify the World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) of the outbreak within 24 hours of the 
first case. On the following day, February 21, the European 
Commission banned the export of live animals, germplasm, 
fresh meat, meat products, milk and milk products, hides, 
and skins of FMD susceptible species from all of the U.K.
The U.S. and Canadian Response to FMD  
in the U.K.
Immediately after FMD was confirmed in the U.K., the 
USDA stepped up its efforts to guard against this disease. 
The importation of swine, ruminants, any fresh swine or 
ruminant meat (chilled or frozen), and other products of 
swine and ruminant origin from the E.U. was temporarily 
prohibited. Travelers were stopped from carrying into the U.S. 
any agricultural products, particularly animal products from 
the E.U. that could spread the disease. Security was tightened 
at ports of entry and airports to ensure that passengers, 
luggage, and cargo were checked as appropriate. The USDA 
also took steps to monitor the situation, in coordination with 
state agriculture officials, and developed a public education 
campaign that included additional signs in airports, public 
service announcements, an information hotline, web site, and 
other tools to inform the public about the issue. In addition, 
the U.S. sent a team of experts to the E.U. to monitor, evaluate, 
and assist in containment efforts. As the FMD outbreak grew 
in the U.K., the USDA established an emergency operations 
center to coordinate communication, answer technical 
questions, and provide consumer and traveler information 
about FMD and other related issues. The USDA also reviewed 
its programs and staffing to ensure that appropriate resources 
were available to prevent the entry of FMD into the United 
States, both short and long-term, and to confirm that 
appropriate federal and state emergency operations plans were 
in place to act quickly if an outbreak occurred.
Canada’s response to the confirmation of FMD in the 
U.K. was similar to that of the U.S. Canadian imports of 
susceptible animals from the U.K. were prohibited and the 
CFIA worked closely with the Canada Border Services Agency 
to increase vigilance at all Canadian borders. Both agencies 
contributed to heightening travelers’ awareness, particularly 
among those coming from the U.K., of their responsibilities 
to declare all food, animals, and animal products, which could 
carry FMD virus. The Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade also issued a travel advisory reminding 
travelers from the U.K. to notify customs officials if they 
had visited a farm while abroad and if they planned to visit 
one in Canada in the near future. In addition the CFIA 
developed and published a detailed FMD response plan in 
2006 known as the Foot-and-Mouth Disease Hazard Specific 
Plan. The diagnostic and management principles contained 
in this plan conform to the World Organization of Animal 
Health (OIE) International Animal Health Code. This plan 
draws on concepts and information from similar plans that 
exist in the U.K. and Australia. This document is part of an 
overall management plan used by the CFIA to respond to 
an incursion of an exotic animal disease into Canada and is 
regularly reviewed by all stakeholders. 
Canada, the U.S., and Mexico have also established the North 
American FMD vaccine bank (NAFMDVB) to provide 
emergency FMD vaccines if needed during an outbreak.
Foot and Mouth Disease
in Uruguay 
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) also occurred in Uruguay at 
the same time as the epidemic in the U.K. Although these 
two countries are approximately the same size, their livestock 
composition is quite different. Uruguay had nearly 10.6 
million cattle, compared to 1.6 million in the U.K., but 
fewer sheep and pigs. Faced with a similar number of FMD-
infected farms, the two countries’ approach to this disease 
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The Re-Introduction of FMD Into the Region
In 2000, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay reported outbreaks 
of FMD with both the type O and the type A viruses. FMD 
types A and type O were reported in Argentina, where 124 
premises were eventually involved. Twenty-two facilities were 
affected in Brazil, with 12 confirmed as type O, and three 
farms were infected in an adjacent part of Uruguay. All three 
countries conducted depopulation (‘stamping-out’) campaigns 
and, by the end of 2000, believed the viruses to be eradicated. 
However, in February 2001, Argentina reported the first 
cases of a massive FMD outbreak that would eventually affect 
all three countries. This virus, a type A, spread rapidly and 
explosively through the central and eastern part of Argentina, 
although a special control region prevented the epidemic from 
extending into the south. Despite extensive depopulation 
efforts, the disease had affected over 2,000 premises by the 
end of 2001 and was still out of control in Argentina. Brazil 
reported its first outbreak with this virus in May 2001, in the 
state of Rio Grande do Sul. The affected herd and contact 
animals were immediately culled, and a vaccination campaign 
was initiated that prevented the virus from spreading outside 
this state. Ultimately, Brazil would report 37 outbreaks of 
FMD in Rio Grande do Sul in 2001.
On April 23, 2001, FMD type A appeared in Uruguay, 
apparently spread from Argentina. The first infected farm was 
reported in Palmitas, Soriano Department (state). Palmitas is 
approximately 70 km from Uruguay’s border with Argentina, 
the Uruguay River. Thirty-nine of the 430 cattle on the 
affected farm had signs of FMD. Lesions were not seen on 
the farm’s 640 sheep. The affected and exposed animals were 
killed the following day. On April 26, FMD was found on a 
neighboring farm, which had a mixed population of cattle, 
sheep, and pigs. At the same time, several infected premises 
were found in adjacent Colonia Department, 25 km from 
the Uruguay River and 40 km from the first cases. The zone 
where the outbreak first occurred is economically integrated 
with the adjacent region of Argentina, which was experiencing 
FMD outbreaks, and the virus is assumed to have spread from 
this region via fomites or people.
Quarantines were immediately placed on both affected 
departments and, the following day, the remaining affected 
and exposed animals were destroyed and buried. In total, 
5,093 cattle, 1,511 sheep, and 333 pigs were culled. Three 
days later, the government was forced to suspend the 
stamping-out procedure because of strong resistance by 
local farmers and the discovery that the disease had spread 
to other areas of the country. Authorities learned that, a few 
days before the first cases were recognized, cattle had been 
sold at auction and delivered to other parts of Uruguay. The 
movement of people, agricultural equipment and machinery, 
and milk and beef trucks are also thought to have contributed 
to the spread of the virus. On April 26, Uruguay began ring 
vaccination of cattle within a 10 km radius of the affected 
farms. Beginning on April 27, all movement and trade of 
was drastically different. The U.K. used a stamping-out policy 
with no vaccination, while Uruguay culled few animals and 
concentrated its efforts on a massive vaccination campaign. 
In the U.K., more than six million animals were killed. In 
Uruguay, a little over 6,900 animals were killed, and over 
24 million doses of vaccine were used. The two outbreaks 
lasted about the same time, but the overall cost to control the 
epidemic was far less in Uruguay. The FMD outbreak in the 
U.K. is estimated to have cost approximately $5 billion to 
agriculture and the food chain and an additional $5 billion 
from loss of tourism. The cost of the outbreak in Uruguay was 
$243.6 million, with much of this due to the loss of export 
markets. This outbreak illustrates how in some situations 
vaccination can be effective in controlling and eradicating an 
FAD. 
Foot and Mouth Disease Control  
in South America
In 1987, the countries of South America established the 
Hemispheric Plan for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth 
Disease (PHEFA). Under this plan, comprehensive vaccination 
with modern, improved vaccines was the backbone of 
eradication efforts, but depopulation was also conducted if the 
disease threatens a disease-free region. The adoption of PHEFA 
led to a decrease in the number of FMD outbreaks reported in 
South America from 955 in 1990 to 130 in 1999.
Livestock production is the major agricultural activity in 
Uruguay, and a significant contributor to its economy. 
Livestock represent more than 65% of all exports. However, 
the presence of FMD or vaccination for this disease places 
significant restrictions on trade. In the 1990s, the European 
Union decided to stop general vaccination for FMD, 
prompting South American meat-exporting countries to 
discontinue vaccination if possible, to acquire a more favorable 
trade status. In 1994, Uruguay was recognized by the OIE 
as “FMD free where vaccination is practiced.” In the same 
year, it discontinued vaccination, in the hope of obtaining 
the status of “FMD free without vaccination,” a goal it 
achieved in 1996. Also hoping to achieve the coveted “FMD 
free without vaccination” status, Argentina and Paraguay 
stopped vaccinating in 1999, as did portions of Brazil in 2000. 
However, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, and 
parts of Brazil continued to report FMD outbreaks through 
the 1990s and continued to vaccinate.
As a result of discontinuing vaccination, Uruguay, Argentina, 
Paraguay, and parts of Brazil were at great risk for FMD. Their 
increased susceptibility was due in part to the progressive loss 
of immunity in large cattle populations over a short period 
of time, the continual danger of the spread of FMD from the 
remaining endemic areas, and the movement of large numbers 
of now-susceptible young livestock to fattening areas. Within a 
few years, FMD invaded the southern region of South America.
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animals were prohibited throughout the country. On April 
30, vaccination was extended to form a protective barrier 
to prevent the virus from entering uninfected states or 
neighboring countries. 
The Vaccination Program
On May 5, Uruguayan authorities initiated a massive 
vaccination program for all cattle. The Uruguayan veterinary 
services established a vaccination timetable, scheduling routes, 
dates, and times. The vaccine was provided to farmers free 
of charge, and the farmers were responsible for vaccinating 
their animals within a given time period. Animals in areas 
adjacent to the state of Rio Grande do Sul were vaccinated 
first in order to protect Brazilian livestock. Vaccination 
proceeded from north to south and from east to west, and was 
completed on June 7; movement and transit restrictions were 
then relaxed. In total, nearly 11 million cattle were vaccinated. 
Government-administered serological tests at the completion 
of the vaccination program suggested that compliance 
had been 99%. Uruguay’s 12 million sheep, which share 
pastures with the cattle, were not vaccinated; however, this 
did not seem to hamper the eradication of the virus. The 
approximately 270,000 pigs were also left unvaccinated, as the 
vaccine used was not thought to be effective in this species. At 
the height of the epidemic, 40-60 infected farms were being 
found each day; however, by the end of the first round of 
vaccination, there were fewer than 10 new foci per day. 
From June 15 to July 22, Uruguay conducted a re-vaccination 
program. A total of 24 million doses of FMD oil-adjuvanted 
vaccines were distributed during these two vaccination 
rounds. In November 2001, an additional 4.5 million young 
cattle that had been born since 2000 were vaccinated or 
re-vaccinated, and each animal was identified by an ear-tag 
tracking system. This revaccination effort boosted immunity 
in the cattle population to the optimum levels, and decreased 
the risk that vaccinated animals might become carriers. A few 
days after the completion of the second round of vaccination, 
only a few sporadic cases were being found. The last case of 
FMD was found on a dairy farm on August 21. By October, 
Uruguay was again classified as “FMD free where vaccination 
is practiced” Re-vaccination of all cattle was carried out again 
in February 2002 and May 2002.
There have been some concerns about the use of vaccines in 
eradication efforts. Some FMD outbreaks in the past were 
linked to incompletely inactivated, older vaccines. Although 
newer vaccines use better inactivation methods, there are still 
fears that this could occur. It may also be possible for animals 
to become FMD carriers, even when vaccinated. In this South 
American epidemic, there were no documented cases of 
vaccinated animals causing new outbreaks. 
The Cost of the Outbreak
From April 23 to August 21, 2001, a total of 2,057 farms or 
facilities in Uruguay were affected by FMD, a number similar 
to the farms affected by the epidemic in the U.K. However, 
Uruguay was able to eradicate its extensive outbreak solely 
by restrictions on livestock movement and the vaccination of 
cattle, in spite of having a large and fully susceptible sheep 
population in close contact with the cattle. The total direct 
cost of eradication was estimated at $13.6 million. Vaccine 
purchases accounted for $7.5 million, with the remainder 
used for compensation payments to farmers, cleaning and 
disinfection, and operating expenses. The $13.6 million does 
not include some expenses incurred by the Army, which 
collaborated by controlling illegal livestock movements in 
border areas and providing other support. Argentina and Brazil 
also managed to control their epidemics, in part by vaccination.
The loss of export markets and a pronounced decrease in 
livestock prices associated with the epidemic were costly for 
Uruguay. The estimated losses as a result of the closing of 
external markets to Uruguayan farmers exceeded $200 million. 
Financial losses to meat and dairy producers, in particular, 
had a significant negative impact on the national economy. 
In addition, movement restrictions on the entire livestock 
sector affected many workers and associated industries such 
as packing plants. Losses associated with closed packing 
plants, as well as the return of 380 containers of meat that 
were in transatlantic transit at the time of the outbreak, added 
approximately $30 million in costs. In total, the epidemic cost 
Uruguay approximately $243.6 million, a much smaller figure 
than the approximately $10 billion in losses to agriculture, the 
food chain, and tourism during the outbreak in the U.K. In 
addition, approximately 6,900 animals were culled in Uruguay 
compared with the more than four million animals killed in the 
U.K. As of September 2009, Uruguay was recognized by the 
OIE as “FMD free where vaccination is practiced.”
Classical Swine Fever 
in the United Kingdom 
Like foot and mouth disease, classical swine fever (CSF) is a 
disease that can spread widely among naive herds, and has a 
devastating effect on international trade. An outbreak of CSF 
in the United Kingdom illustrates the tracing, control, and 
eradication of an FAD before it became widespread.
On August 4, 2000, a suspected outbreak of classical 
swine fever in a pig herd was reported to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) Animal Health 
Divisional Office at Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk. The herd 
consisted of 3,500 weaned pigs in seven houses. The pigs had 
been ill since July 11, when weaned pigs had been introduced 
from a breeding/multiplier unit. The infection had spread to 
four houses and, as of August 4, a total of 1,110 pigs were ill 
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isolates can be more difficult to recognize, particularly in older 
pigs that have developed some immunity after exposure. These 
infections may be relatively mild, and can resemble other 
diseases. In some herds where this virus has become endemic, 
the only symptom may be poor reproductive performance 
or the failure of some pigs to thrive. The wide range of 
clinical signs and similarity to other diseases can make CSF 
challenging to diagnose.
Tracing the Virus
In the U.K., the source of the outbreak appears to have 
been the breeding farm identified on August 7. The 
epidemiological inquiry found that the CSF virus probably 
entered the breeding unit on May 1 then spread to the index 
farm and herd of rearing pigs by the movement of infected 
pigs. These three farms were all owned by or contracted to the 
U.K.’s largest outdoor pig rearing company. The company’s 
pigs were born on breeding units and remained there for 
approximately three to four weeks before being moved to 
rearing premises where they remained for a further six to 
eight weeks. From the rearing units, the pigs moved to 
finishing units where they remained for 10 weeks before being 
slaughtered. This method of swine production was designed 
to reduce the transmission of enzootic diseases from older 
finishing pigs to young growing pigs, by weaning the pigs 
early and distributing them to a series of remote locations.
All rearing and finishing premises that had received pigs 
born after May 1 at the breeding unit were traced, tested 
for classical swine fever, and placed under official movement 
restrictions. All pigs on premises that had received pigs 
born after June 1 were treated as “dangerous contacts” and 
were destroyed. The other 47 breeding herds owned by or 
contracted to the production company were traced, placed 
under quarantine, clinically inspected by a MAFF veterinary 
officer, and sampled for evidence of CSF. The government 
traced the movements of the transporter who took weaned 
and about 200 had died. A MAFF veterinary officer visited 
the premises the same day and, after examining the pigs on 
site, placed the holding under official movement restrictions 
and took blood samples to test the pigs for classical and 
African swine fever, two very similar FADs. On August 7, 
two incidents of suspected classical swine fever were reported 
on other farms. One case was in a herd of rearing pigs. The 
second was in a breeding herd that had supplied weaned pigs 
to the other two infected farms. Both herds were immediately 
placed under quarantine and blood samples were sent for 
laboratory examination.
An outbreak of classical swine fever was declared on August 
8, 2000. National and local crisis centers were established 
to deal with the outbreak. Three-kilometer protection and 
10-kilometer surveillance zones were established around the 
infected premises and the movement of all pigs within the 
zones was prohibited. The remaining 3,300 pigs on the first 
identified farm were killed on August 10 and their carcasses 
destroyed by rendering. The premises were cleaned and 
disinfected on August 11. The other two farms were also 
depopulated. The movements of pigs, feedstuffs, vehicles, 
and people onto and off the premises were traced to identify 
possible sources of the virus and limit the spread of infection. 
During the next few months, classical swine fever was found 
on several more farms. Before the first farm had been placed 
under quarantine, it had sent infected pigs to four other 
premises. The disease also spread to two contiguous outdoor 
pig farms. From one of those, classical swine fever spread to 
another contiguous holding and then, through the movement 
of pigs, to two additional premises. Two more outbreaks 
occurred in pig units owned by haulage operators. A total of 
16 infected sites were confirmed in Britain between August 
4 and November 3. However, by December the outbreak 
had been contained. All controls relating to the 16 infected 
premises were lifted on December 30, 2000.
What is Classical Swine Fever?
Classical swine fever, also known as hog cholera, is a highly 
contagious disease of pigs caused by the CSF virus. Pigs 
can become infected by ingestion, inhalation, genital 
(semen) infection, or wound contamination. CSF virus is 
often spread by contact with infected pigs or the feeding of 
inadequately cooked garbage (swill), but the virus can also 
be transmitted on fomites. Virus shedding can begin before 
the onset of clinical signs, occurs throughout the course of 
acute or subclinical disease, and may go on continuously 
or intermittently for months in chronically infected pigs. 
CSF virus can also remain infectious for long periods in 
refrigerated, frozen, smoked or cured meat. The clinical signs 
vary with the strain of virus, and the age and susceptibility 
of the animal. Acute cases, which are caused by highly 
virulent isolates and have a high mortality rate, are likely to 
be diagnosed rapidly. However, infections with less virulent 
Classical swine fever is highly 
contagious. 
Source: Dr. Alejandro Ramirez, 
Iowa State University
‘Button’ ulcers are sometimes 
found in the intestinal lining in pigs 
infected with CSF.
Source: USDA APHIS 
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pigs from the breeding premises. All premises that the 
transporter had visited were tested and placed under official 
movement restrictions.
The origin of the virus and its route of introduction were not 
established with complete certainty. However, the evidence 
strongly suggests that CSF virus was not established by 
the introduction of infected pigs, contact with feral pigs, 
contaminated vehicles or personnel, discharges of effluent, 
or contaminated vaccines and biological products. It is more 
likely that the infection was introduced in contaminated pig 
meat in food discarded by people; a public footpath runs 
adjacent to the outdoor paddocks containing dry sows on the 
breeding farm. The viral strain is in the same genetic group 
that was isolated during a classical swine fever outbreak in 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain in 1997–98.
New World Screwworm
(Cochliomyia hominivorax) 
in the United States 
Screwworms are parasitic flies whose larvae feed on the flesh 
of living animals. New World screwworms were once endemic 
throughout the southern United States, but they were eradicated 
by a program that involved the release of sterile male flies. 
These parasitic flies still exist in South America and parts of the 
Caribbean, and North American veterinarians in private practice 
have occasionally identified cases in imported animals. Although 
some infestations occur in pets, which have minimal import 
requirements, an outbreak in 2000 illustrates the importance 
of remaining vigilant even when an animal has been imported 
through a quarantine facility. If screwworm larvae are allowed 
to drop to the ground and pupate, the resulting adult flies could 
reestablish the species in North America. 
On February 27, 2000, a shipment of 17 horses from 
Argentina arrived at a quarantine facility in Miami, Florida. 
Two days later, 16 of the 17 horses were released from 
quarantine. On March 1, the one remaining horse, a four-
year-old chestnut thoroughbred gelding, was also released. 
The next day, a private practitioner performed a physical 
examination on this horse and found minor discharge from 
the prepuce, no swelling, and a foul odor—and, on closer 
examination, a number of insect larvae in the penis. The 
practitioner collected 50-100 larvae from the distal penis of 
the horse and contacted federal authorities. On March 3, a 
USDA APHIS foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD) 
submitted samples of larvae from the horse to the USDA 
National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, 
Iowa, and appropriately treated the horse and premises. On 
March 4, the NVSL confirmed that the samples from the 
horse were screwworm larvae in the third instar stage. The 
horse received a second treatment on March 6 and remained 
in quarantine until its wound was completely healed. It was 
released from quarantine on March 15, after being examined 
by a federal veterinarian. The other 16 horses in the February 
27 shipment were traced and each horse was examined twice 
by a FADD, at three to five day intervals. No evidence of 
disease was found in any of these horses. APHIS Veterinary 
Services began intensive screwworm surveillance in Florida 
and sentinel animals were placed in the West Palm Beach area 
from March 10 to April 17. Screwworms were not found.
What are Screwworms?
Screwworm myiasis is a devastating parasitic disease that has 
long been a leading cause of livestock losses in tropical areas 
of the Western Hemisphere. The larvae of the New World 
screwworm fly, Cochliomyia hominivorax, feed on the open 
wounds of warm-blooded animals, including humans. Female 
flies are attracted to wounds or mucous membranes, where 
they lay their eggs. After hatching, the larvae burrow into 
the flesh. Unlike ordinary maggots that subsist on debris and 
dead tissue, screwworm larvae attack living flesh, causing 
debilitation and sometimes even death. Wounds prone to 
screwworm infestation include those caused by feeding ticks, 
the bites of vampire bats, castration, dehorning, branding, 
shearing, wire cuts, sore mouth in sheep, and shedding of 
the velvet in deer. The navels of newborn mammals are also 
common sites of infestation. Once screwworm larvae have 
matured, they leave the wound and drop to the ground, 
where they pupate and emerge as adult flies.
New World screwworms were once found throughout the 
tropical and subtropical areas of North, Central, and South 
America, but they have been eradicated from many countries 
by a series of cooperative programs involving the release of 
(1) The screwworm fly lays her 
eggs at the edge of a wound on a 
warm-blooded animal.
(3) Mature larvae burrow into the 
ground where they pupate.
(2) Larvae develop in the wound, 
feeding on the flesh, and then drop 
out of the wound onto the ground.
(4) Adult flies emerge from the pupal 
stage to mate and renew the cycle.
Source: USDA APHIS
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two patients with encephalitis. On investigation, NYCDOH 
initially identified a cluster of six patients with encephalitis, 
five of whom had profound muscle weakness. Testing of 
these initial cases was positive for St. Louis encephalitis virus, 
an endemic mosquito-borne flavivirus, on September 3 at 
the CDC. The earliest cases occurred among residents of a 
two square mile area in northern Queens. On the basis of 
these findings, aerial and ground applications of mosquito 
adulticides and larvacides were begun in northern Queens and 
South Bronx on September 3.
The Identification of West Nile Virus
In Ames, Iowa, the NVSL isolated a virus from the birds’ 
tissues and, after ruling out several viral agents that cause 
encephalitis in birds, performed electron microscopy to 
examine its structure. Forty nanometer virus particles with the 
morphology of togaviruses or flaviviruses were observed. On 
September 20, the NVSL forwarded the virus cultures to the 
CDC for identification and characterization. Testing at the 
CDC on September 23 indicated that the isolate was closely 
related to West Nile virus, which had never been isolated 
in the Western Hemisphere. CDC experts also detected 
flavivirus antigens in one of the human autopsy specimens 
by immunohistochemistry and found a West Nile-like virus 
genomic sequence in a human brain specimen from an 
encephalitis case. The genetic sequence was identical to that 
derived from the bird tissues. Concurrently, specimens of 
brain tissue from three human encephalitis cases, forwarded 
by the New York State Department of Health to the 
University of California, Irvine, were reported as positive for 
West Nile-like virus sequence by genomic analysis. 
By September 28, 17 confirmed and 20 probable human cases 
and four deaths had been reported in New York City and the 
surrounding counties. Although cases were seen in patients as 
young as 15 years, most occurred in older patients, with the 
most severe clinical cases and all fatalities occurring among 
the elderly. In October 1999, the NVSL first isolated WNV 
from the brain tissue of a Long Island horse that had clinical 
encephalitis. WNV was also isolated at NVSL from two 
additional encephalitic horses in 1999, and WNV antibodies 
were identified in ill horses in Suffolk and Essex counties, 
New York. Retrospective classification of likely West Nile cases 
occurring prior to October resulted in a total of 25 equine cases. 
What is West Nile Virus?
West Nile virus is a flavivirus that, like St. Louis encephalitis 
virus, belongs to the Japanese encephalitis subgroup of 
the Flaviviridae. This subgroup contains closely related, 
mosquito-borne viruses, which may cross-react in serological 
tests. WNV was first isolated in the West Nile province of 
Uganda in 1937. It is a mosquito-transmitted virus that 
cycles between birds and mosquitoes in endemic regions. In 
sterile male flies. This approach, conducted and sustained by 
the USDA APHIS, has systematically eliminated screwworms 
from the U.S., Mexico, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
Islands, Curacao, and all of Central America. Screwworms 
were last reported in Panama in 2005, and an eradication 
program is ongoing in Jamaica. Because screwworms are still 
widespread in South America, sterile fly releases across eastern 
Panama continue to be necessary even though Panama has 
become screwworm-free. The sterile flies create and maintain 
a biological barrier in Panama’s Darien Gap, halting the pest’s 
northward migration at the Panama-Colombia border.
 
West Nile Virus
in the Americas
West Nile virus (WNV) is a mosquito-borne virus that, until 
1999, was found only in the Eastern Hemisphere. In 1999, 
this virus was introduced in the New York City area. Despite 
eradication efforts, WNV became established in North 
America and eventually in Central and South America. This 
outbreak provides lessons about detecting and responding 
to a new disease, including the importance of local disease 
surveillance and response systems, communication among 
public health agencies, and links between public and animal 
health agencies. It also illustrates the dangers of FADs that 
can become established in arthropod vectors and/or wildlife, 
and the difficulty in preventing their establishment despite 
vigilance and a prompt response.
Tracy McNamara, DVM, head of the department of 
pathology at the Bronx Zoo, became concerned in early 
August 1999, when she heard that a large number of crows 
had been dying around the zoo. By late August, 40 crows had 
died. Then birds at the zoo began to die. Over the Labor Day 
weekend, the zoo lost a Guanay Cormorant, three Chilean 
flamingos, a pheasant, and a bald eagle. Because these deaths 
followed those of the crows, experts strongly doubted that 
the disease originated in the zoo. Necropsies of the birds 
revealed streaking in the heart and brain hemorrhages. 
Eastern equine encephalitis was suspected but McNamara 
was skeptical because the emus in her care, which are very 
susceptible to eastern equine encephalitis virus, were thriving. 
“It was becoming more and more suggestive that this was 
not a regular bird disease,” McNamara said. When two more 
flamingos died on September 9, she sent samples to the 
USDA’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) 
in Ames, Iowa. The NVSL ruled out avian influenza and 
Newcastle disease viruses. The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) was also sent samples, as were doctors 
at an Army laboratory in Fort Detrick, Maryland.
Meanwhile, on August 23, 1999, an infectious disease 
physician from a hospital in northern Queens contacted the 
New York City Department of Health (NYCDOH) to report 
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some birds, viremia can persist for more than three months, 
possibly contributing to the overwintering of the virus. Most 
infected birds in the Eastern Hemisphere carry this virus 
asymptomatically. When environmental conditions favor 
high viral amplification, mosquitoes can also spread the virus 
to mammals. Horses, humans, and most other mammals 
are dead end hosts that cannot infect mosquitoes; however, 
squirrels and chipmunks, as well as alligators, have higher 
levels of viremia and might be capable of amplifying the virus.
Among mammals, symptomatic infections mainly seem 
to occur in humans and horses. Occasional cases have also 
been reported in other species including alpacas, sheep, 
reindeer, wild squirrels, harbor seals, rhinoceroses, and 
dogs. Approximately 80 percent of people who become 
infected with WNV remain asymptomatic, while 20 percent 
develop flu-like symptoms. Fewer than one percent develop 
neurological signs, but these cases can be severe, with signs 
and sentinel chickens was used to assess WNV distribution 
in the region. Emergency telephone hotlines were established 
in New York City and in Westchester County to address 
public inquiries about the encephalitis outbreak and pesticide 
application. Approximately 300,000 cans of DEET-based 
mosquito repellant were distributed citywide through local 
firehouses, and 750,000 public health leaflets were distributed 
with information about personal protection against mosquito 
bites. Recurring public messages were announced on radio, 
television, web sites, and in newspapers, urging personal 
protection against mosquito bites. Recommended actions 
included limiting outdoor activity during the peak hours of 
mosquito activity, wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants, 
using DEET-based insect repellents, and eliminating any 
potential mosquito breeding niches. Spraying schedules were 
also publicized and people were advised to remain indoors 
during spraying to reduce pesticide exposure.
By the end of 1999, WNV had been identified in a limited 
area of the northeastern United States in wild birds, 
mosquitoes, humans, and horses. Illness in humans and 
horses occurred only from early August through late October 
and was limited to New York. WNV activity ended for the 
season because of various factors, including climate and 
vector control activities. In all, 62 human cases, with seven 
deaths, were recognized in 1999. Twenty-five cases of West 
Nile encephalitis were also identified in horses, all in Suffolk 
and Nassau Counties on Long Island, New York. Because 
horses do not play a role in the transmission of WNV, 
quarantines were never placed on any asymptomatic horses 
in the outbreak area. However, some horse movements were 
restricted, particularly the export of horses from affected areas 
to the European Union and the shipment of any horses to the 
E.U. via Kennedy airport.
In genetic sequencing studies, WNV isolates from the New 
York outbreak showed strong similarities to isolates from 
Israel, suggesting that this region may have been the origin of 
the virus. How WNV was introduced into the United States 
is unknown, but most speculation has centered on infected 
birds or mosquitoes.
The Continuing Spread of West Nile Virus
Although authorities hoped that the outbreak had ended with 
the coming of winter and the resulting death of mosquito 
populations, WNV reemerged in the U.S. in 2000. Twenty-
one human cases of West Nile encephalitis were reported. 
Two elderly patients, an 82-year-old man in New Jersey and 
an 87-year-old woman in New York, died of the disease. Sixty 
equine cases were confirmed in seven states, and infections 
were found among birds in 12 states and the District of 
Columbia. Evidence of WNV infection was also reported 
among wild mammals. In 2001, the virus was transported 
through bird migration south to Florida and west to Iowa. 
By the end of the 2002 mosquito season, WNV occurred 
The West Nile Virus is a mosquito-transmited virus that mostly cycles between 
birds and mosquitos. However, when environmental conditions are optimal the 
disease can be spread to mammals. Horses are susceptible.
Source: Clint May, Iowa State University
of encephalitis, meningitis, or flaccid paralysis that resembles 
polio. Severe cases and neurological signs are more likely to 
occur in people over 50 years of age and patients who are 
immunocompromised. Like humans, most infected horses are 
symptomatic, but some animals develop neurological signs 
and may die.
The Response to the Outbreak
Vector control measures had been initiated in northern 
Queens and the South Bronx on September 3, when the 
disease was still thought to be St. Louis encephalitis. These 
measures were followed by a citywide pesticide application, 
after a laboratory confirmed a case of West Nile encephalitis in 
a Brooklyn resident with no travel history to Queens, and two 
additional cases in the South Bronx. Surveillance of wild birds 
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strains have also been isolated in the Americas since 2003. In 
the U.S., relatively few people have antibodies to WNV, and 
outbreaks are expected to occur each summer. Surprisingly, 
far fewer clinical cases or deaths have been reported in Central 
and South America. The reason for this pattern of disease is 
not known; however, it might involve protective immunity 
to cross-reactive flaviviruses, the occurrence of WNV isolates 
with decreased virulence, decreased surveillance and diagnosis, 
or other causes. In areas where dengue, another flaviviral 
disease, is present, some West Nile infections could be 
misdiagnosed as this disease.
Commercial vaccines are now available for horses in North 
America. As a result, the number of West Nile virus cases in 
U.S. horses decreased from more than 15,000 in 2002, to 
approximately 1400 in 2004. Vaccines are sometimes used 
“off label” to protect sensitive birds or other species. For 
instance, in an effort to minimize the impact of West Nile 
virus on endangered California condors, captive condors have 
been vaccinated since 2003, and attempts have been made 
to vaccinate wild chicks in the nest. No human vaccine is 
available yet.
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
in the United Kingdom and Other Countries
Occasionally, an outbreak is caused by a disease that is 
recognized for the first time. One of the most wide-reaching 
incidents occurred in the 1980s, when bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) appeared in the United Kingdom. This 
orally transmitted disease, which has an incubation period 
of years, had been spreading through the cattle population 
of the U.K. via ruminant feed, possibly since the 1970s. It 
erupted as a mysterious epidemic that ultimately killed more 
than 170,000 cattle in the U.K. over the next 20 years, spread 
to humans, housecats, and some zoo animals, and affected 
nations around the world. As a consequence of this epidemic, 
the composition of animal feed was changed, new tests, 
procedures, and rules were developed for meat inspection, and 
even the screening of human blood donors was affected.
The First Cases of BSE
The first clinical cases of BSE were reported in 1984, 
although it would be two years before the nature of the 
disease was actually recognized. On December 22, 1984, 
Peter Stent of Pitsham Farm in Sussex called Dr. David Bee, 
a private veterinarian, to examine a cow with an arched back 
and weight loss. This animal developed a head tremor and 
incoordination before dying a few weeks later. Over the next 
few months, animals on Pitsham Farms continued to have 
unusual neurological syndromes, and by the end of April, five 
more cows had died. Dr. Bee requested assistance from the 
Winchester Veterinary Investigation Center of the Veterinary 
throughout the Midwest and was spreading into the western 
states. By 2005, it was found in all U.S. states except Alaska 
and Hawaii. 
In Canada, WNV was first detected in birds and mosquitoes 
in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec in 2001. The first 
human cases were reported in these same provinces in 2002. 
Since then WNV has become endemic and human cases have 
been reported in the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. Sporadic human cases 
detected in some of the other Canadian provinces and 
territories have generally been attributed to travel outside the 
province. In 2002, WNV was diagnosed for the first time in 
horses in Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan and 
in 2003 in horses in Nova Scotia and Alberta. 
West Nile virus also spread to Central and South America 
and the Caribbean. This virus was first reported from some 
countries in South America in 2003. As of 2009, it appears to 
be present in Columbia, Argentina, and Venezuela.
Wild Birds and Reptiles
In the Eastern Hemisphere, West Nile virus usually has little 
or no effect on birds. However, some North American species, 
which were exposed for the first time, have been affected by 
the outbreak. In the U.S., this virus has killed large numbers 
of crows, blue jays, and other corvids, as well as American 
robins, house wrens, eastern bluebirds, tufted titmice, 
chickadees, and sage grouse. Unexpectedly, some species of 
crows, jays, magpies, gulls, and other birds were found to shed 
WNV in oral and cloacal secretions. These birds are able to 
transmit the virus directly, and one outbreak occurred among 
crows in the winter. Outbreaks have also been reported in 
domesticated geese, pheasants, and partridges, and occasional 
cases occur in captive psittacine birds or zoo birds. The effects 
of WNV on threatened or endangered avian species could be 
significant. California condors and greater sage grouse, which 
are both susceptible to this virus, are of particular concern. 
There are also concerns about native bird populations if the 
virus were to be introduced into Hawaii.
In North America, WNV has also revealed an unexpected 
ability to cause neurological disease in reptiles. At one U.S. 
alligator farm with more than 10,000 animals, 250 alligators 
died in an outbreak one year, and more than 1,000 died the 
following year. Young alligators were more severely affected 
than adults. WNV can also cause disease in experimentally 
infected garter snakes.
Future Prospects
West Nile virus continues to change and evolve as it becomes 
established in the Americas. The virus that was originally 
introduced to New York seems to have disappeared, replaced 
by a variant that spreads more efficiently. A few attenuated 
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the BSE agent originated as a spontaneous mutation of a 
cellular protein in cattle, or that it originally came from a 
mutated scrapie agent in ruminant feed.
What are Transmissible Spongiform 
Encephalopathies?
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are 
neurodegenerative diseases caused by prions. Prions are 
infectious proteins that are thought to replicate by converting 
a normal cellular protein, which is found on the surfaces of 
neurons, into copies of the prion. TSEs affecting animals 
include scrapie in sheep and goats, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE, “mad cow disease”) in cattle, 
transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in mink, and 
chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids. Although some 
prion diseases usually occur in one or a few closely related 
species, other prions can cross species barriers. BSE has a 
particularly wide host range. Cattle are the most important 
hosts for this disease, but some other ruminants, cats, lemurs, 
and humans can also be affected; in cats, the disease is known 
as feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE), and in humans, it 
is called variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD). 
Although some prions can also be transmitted by other 
routes, the BSE agent is acquired only by eating contaminated 
tissues from infected animals, or by iatrogenic routes such as 
blood transfusions and organ transplants. BSE prions occur 
mainly in the central nervous system, although they may also 
be found in a few other locations such as the ileum. Once 
an animal becomes infected, it carries the prions for life, and 
its tissues are infectious even if it remains asymptomatic. 
Cooking or rendering an infected tissue does not make it  
safe to eat. 
Animals that have been infected with TSEs usually remain 
asymptomatic for long periods, typically several years, before 
developing clinical signs. Clinical BSE, FSE, and vCJD are 
characterized by behavioral changes and other neurological 
signs. Once the clinical signs develop, these diseases are always 
progressive and fatal. 
Early Precautions
The Southwood Working Party was an advisory board set up 
to provide initial recommendations on the implications of 
BSE. In 1988, the group advised that cattle showing signs of 
BSE be destroyed and that compensation be paid to farmers. 
It also concluded in 1989 that the risk of transmission 
of BSE to humans seemed remote and that “it was most 
unlikely that BSE would have any implications for human 
health.” At the time, very little was known about TSEs 
other than scrapie, which is not zoonotic. The Southwood 
Working Party assumed that BSE was probably derived from 
scrapie and could be expected to behave like it. Precautions 
A cow in the U.K. displaying symptoms of bovine spongiform encephalopathy.
Source: USDA APHIS
Investigation Service, and tissue samples were sent to the 
Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) of the State Veterinary 
Service for analysis. Although a wide range of tests was done 
and some possible diagnoses were suggested, no definitive 
diagnosis could be made. The CVL suggested that Mr. Stent 
submit a live affected cow for euthanasia and necropsy. The 
pathology report on this animal, together with an analysis of 
the feed on the farm, suggested that the problem was caused 
by mycotoxins in contaminated feed. No new cases appeared 
after this time and the veterinarians assumed the problem 
had run its course. 
The mysterious disease soon appeared on other farms in Kent 
and Bristol. By the end of 1986, the Pathology Department 
of the CVL had identified the disease as a probable new 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) of 
cattle and named it bovine spongiform encephalopathy. 
Epidemiological investigations suggested that BSE was caused 
by the consumption of meat-and-bone meal (MBM), a 
common supplement made from animal carcasses that was 
incorporated into cattle feed. At first, cattle were thought to 
have been infected when they ate MBM contaminated with 
the agent that causes scrapie, a TSE of sheep. Scrapie is not 
a new disease, but rendering methods that had previously 
inactivated the scrapie agent had been changed, and might 
have allowed it to remain infectious. It eventually became 
apparent that BSE was widespread in U.K. cattle, and the 
cases of BSE identified between 1986 and 1988 were not 
index cases caused by eating scrapie-contaminated feed. 
The BSE agent had apparently been amplified when tissues 
from BSE-infected cattle were recycled into MBM and other 
ruminant feed supplements, and fed to other cattle. Because 
the incubation period for BSE is very long, large numbers of 
cattle had been infected by the time animals began developing 
clinical signs. Although the origin of the disease will probably 
never be known, it was probably present in cattle since the 
1970s or earlier. The two most popular hypotheses are that 
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to humans, it would resemble Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
(CJD), a neurological disease that occurs in people with 
genetic changes in the cellular equivalent of the prion 
protein. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease occurs sporadically among 
individuals, and the median age of onset is 65 years. In 1991, 
surveillance for atypical cases or changing patterns of CJD 
was put in place. Three dairy farmers with BSE-infected 
herds were diagnosed with CJD between 1992 and 1994. The 
fourth annual report of the CJD Surveillance Unit, issued 
in August 1995, noted the apparently high incidence of 
CJD in farmers. The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory 
Committee wrote a press release about suspected CJD in 
a cattle farmer in October 1995. In 1995, cases also began 
to appear in patients who were unusually young for CJD, 
including Stephen Churchill, an 18-year-old who was later 
confirmed as the first known victim of the new disease. 
To differentiate it from the genetic form of CJD, which is 
not contagious or zoonotic, the new disease was called variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Variant CJD, like BSE, is acquired 
by eating contaminated bovine tissues. Because cooking 
does not destroy the BSE agent, there is no practical way to 
prevent human infections except to keep BSE-contaminated 
tissues out of the human food chain. Bans on the use of 
certain bovine tissues in human food have been put into place 
in the U.K. and many other countries. In some countries, 
rapid tests are done on higher risk (or all) cattle at slaughter, 
and carcasses cannot be used in human food until this test 
is negative. Although these measures have decreased the 
incidence of vCJD, the incubation period for TSEs is long and, 
not surprisingly, cases continue to be diagnosed. Iatrogenic 
routes of spread including blood transfusions have also been 
recognized. As a result, restrictions have been placed on blood 
donations from donors with a known risk for vCJD. Annual 
vCJD-related deaths in the U.K. rose gradually to a high of 
28 in 2000, and gradually fell to five cases per year in 2005 
through 2007, with one case reported in 2008 and no cases in 
the first half of 2009. As of May 2009, 210 cases of vCJD had 
been reported worldwide, including 165 cases from the U.K. 
and 24 from France. Many people with vCJD had lived in the 
U.K. between 1980 and 1996 and had been exposed to BSE 
there. As of 2009, all vCJD cases diagnosed in the U.S. and 
Canada are thought to have been acquired in other countries.
Feline Spongiform Encephalopathy  
and Other BSE-Linked Diseases
The first feline TSE was recognized in May 1990, in a cat 
diagnosed with a ‘scrapie-like’ spongiform encephalopathy. 
This disease, which was named feline spongiform 
encephalopathy (FSE), was later linked to the ingestion of the 
BSE prion in beef products. Between 1990 and 2007, FSE 
was diagnosed in nearly a hundred housecats and 22 zoo cats. 
Tissues that have a high risk of transmitting BSE have been 
banned from pet foods in the U.K. since 1990, and are no 
were put in place that went beyond the Working Party’s 
recommendations, and an expert committee was set up to 
advise BSE research.
Once MBM was identified as the probable source of BSE in 
1988, the government banned the incorporation of ruminant 
protein into ruminant feed. Although this ban reduced the 
escalating rate of infection, cross-contamination between 
ruminant feed and other products in feedmills allowed 
thousands more cattle to become infected. Because the 
incubation period for BSE is usually 2-8 years, this was not 
apparent at the time. It was later discovered that a cow could 
become infected by eating a piece of infectious tissue as small 
as a peppercorn. Cases of BSE continued to be found, and the 
regulations were revised in 1994 and a rigorous enforcement 
campaign was begun. After March 1996, when it had become 
apparent that BSE was not limited to cattle, the incorporation 
of all animal protein in animal feed was banned in the U.K. 
The BSE epidemic in the U.K. peaked in 1992, with nearly 
1,000 new cases confirmed each week. At the time, the annual 
incidence in affected herds was approximately 2-3 percent. As a 
result of the feed bans, the incidence declined to approximately 
5-10 new cases per week by 2004. 
Recognition of the Risks to Humans:  
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
In June 1989, a precautionary ban was placed on the use 
of specified bovine offal (SBO) in human food. Specified 
bovine offal includes the brain, spinal cord, spleen, thymus, 
tonsils, and intestines of cattle. Concerns were also raised 
about the possibility that scraps of spinal cord might remain 
after meat processing, or that neural tissues might remain in 
mechanically recovered meat (mechanically removed scraps 
attached to the vertebral column). Instances of failure to 
remove all of the spinal cord from the carcass were discovered 
and, in December 1995, the extraction of mechanically 
recovered meat from the spinal column of cattle was banned. 
As time passed, increasing knowledge about BSE made 
the theory that it would behave like scrapie less and less 
viable. Scientists suspected that, if BSE were to spread 
Normal bovine brain tissue The spongiform lesions of BSE
Source: USDA APHIS
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longer fed to zoo cats. The FSE outbreak has been declining 
with the BSE epidemic. The two most recent cases in 
housecats were reported in a cat from the U.K. in 2001, and a 
Swiss cat in 2003. A cheetah in a German zoo was diagnosed 
with FSE in 2007, and had probably been infected in the 
Netherlands where she was born.
BSE has also been reported from exotic ruminants, including 
nyala, kudu, gemsbok, eland, oryx, and bison, in zoos. Field 
cases were documented in two goats, and experimental 
infections have been reported in both sheep and goats. 
Two lemurs at a French zoo were apparently infected in 
contaminated feed.
BSE Outside the United Kingdom
As a result of the BSE epidemic, the European Union and 
many individual countries prohibited the importation of 
live cattle and bovine products from the U.K. Despite these 
measures, BSE spread to countries outside the U.K. – not 
a surprising result given the long incubation period for 
this disease. The prevalence of BSE in countries where it 
has become endemic varies widely. In some countries, the 
estimated prevalence may be more than 100 cases per million 
cattle; in others, there may be fewer than two cases per 
million. The peak of the epidemic curve has varied, occurring 
later in countries where feed bans were established more 
recently than the U.K. 
BSE in Canada
Following the recognition of BSE in the U.K. in 1986, 
Canada required in 1987 that all cattle imported from the 
U.K. be certified as originating from a farm that was free of 
BSE. Canada also prohibited the importation of rendered 
products from all countries other than the U.S. beginning 
in 1998. In 1990, Canada imposed an importation ban on 
live cattle from countries reporting cases of BSE. In addition, 
active surveillance of cattle imported from the U.K. between 
1982 and 1990 was initiated. In 1991, BSE was declared 
a reportable disease in Canada and, in 1992, a surveillance 
program for BSE was initiated targeting cattle older than 
three years of age with neurologic signs that could not be 
attributed to rabies. In 1993, BSE was diagnosed in a beef 
cow that had been imported from Britain in 1987. This 
animal and its herdmates and offspring were destroyed, as 
were cattle imported from the U.K. between 1982 and 1990. 
To further decrease the risk of introducing BSE into the 
Canadian herd, Canada implemented a feed ban in March of 
1997 which prohibited the feeding of ruminant-derived meat 
and bone meal (MBM) to ruminants. 
Canada announced the detection of its first indigenous case 
of BSE in a 6-year-old beef cow from northern Alberta in 
May of 2003. Since this animal was condemned at slaughter, 
no potentially infective material entered the human food 
chain. However, the carcass minus the head was rendered and 
processed into animal feed ingredients intended to be fed to 
animals other than ruminants. Although the probability of 
recycling the agent to ruminants through animal feed was 
deemed low, three farms with cattle that may have consumed 
poultry feed with rendered products derived from this case 
were quarantined and the cattle destroyed. The index case 
might have originated from any of eight herds; therefore, its 
birth cohort was assumed to include animals from all eight 
herds. This culminated in the destruction of over 2700 animals 
that might have been exposed to a common feed source, 
along with the infected cow. Over 2000 of these animals 
over 24 months of age were tested for BSE and found to be 
negative. The economic impacts of this single case of BSE 
to the Canadian beef production and related industries were 
catastrophic due to the loss of export markets, but domestic 
consumer confidence in the safety of Canadian beef remained 
strong. The most likely source of BSE in this case was a limited 
number of cattle imported into Canada and the U.S. from the 
U.K. in the 1980’s. The tissues from these animals had entered 
the animal feed chain prior to the implementation of the feed 
ban. A case of BSE diagnosed in the U.S. in December 2003 
was also traced back to a farm in Alberta.
At the conclusion of the investigation into the 2003 BSE case, 
the Canadian government announced regulations to remove 
BSE specific risk material (SRM) from all cattle at slaughter. 
SRM are tissues that, in BSE infected cattle, are most likely to 
contain the BSE prion. These tissues include the skull, brain, 
trigeminal ganglia, eyes, tonsils, spinal cord, and dorsal root 
ganglia of cattle aged 30 months and older, and the ileum of 
cattle of all ages. The removal of SRM eliminates almost all 
BSE infectivity from bovine products and serves to safeguard 
the human food supply. In addition to banning SRM from 
the human food chain, Canada implemented an enhanced 
BSE surveillance program in January of 2004 which involved 
targeted testing of cattle at highest risk of having BSE, i.e., 
down, diseased, dead, or dying cattle over 30 months of age. 
As of September 2009, roughly 260,000 cattle have been 
tested through this program and Canada has identified 15 
additional cases of BSE, all of them on farm. These cases have 
ranged in age from 4 to 16 years with the majority being 6 
to 8 years old. Two cases were detected in 2005, five in 2006, 
three in 2007, four in 2008, and one in 2009. The majority 
of these cases were from Alberta but three cases were from 
British Columbia and one was from Manitoba. No part of 
any of these animals entered the human food or animal feed 
chains and all of the animals were removed from the farm and 
incinerated. No additional cases of BSE were detected during 
the investigation of these 15 cases. Some of these BSE cases 
were attributed to feeding ruminant MBM to cattle in their 
first year of life when such practices were still legal. Later cases, 
which arose after the implementation of the feed ban, have 
been ascribed to possible residual contamination of the feed 
system through the presence of old food in the system or cross 
contamination during manufacture, mixing, or distribution. In 
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particularly at high-risk cattle such as nonambulatory animals 
and those with neurological signs. These animals cannot be 
used in human food, and the carcass is held until BSE testing 
is complete. The U.S. also conducts passive surveillance for this 
disease. When an infected animal is identified, the affected herd 
is quarantined, and the source of the infection is investigated.
The intensified surveillance found two cases of BSE in 
indigenous animals. In 2004, a 12-year-old Brahma cross cow 
from Texas was sold in a livestock sale and transported to a 
packing plant. The animal, which was dead on arrival, was 
sent to a pet food plant, where it was sampled for BSE. The 
carcass was incinerated and it was not used in pet food. The 
infected animal was traced to the ranch in Texas where it had 
been born and raised. All adult animals that left this farm after 
1990, and the two calves born to the infected cow within 2 
years of its death were traced. Most of these animals had been 
slaughtered, died, or were presumed to be dead, although 
a few animals were untraceable. One surviving animal was 
tested and found to be negative, and another was determined 
to be of no interest due to its age. The investigation suggested 
that this cow, which had been born before the USDA 
implemented the ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban, had been 
infected from that source. The second indigenous case of 
BSE, found on a farm in Alabama in 2006, occurred in a 
Santa Gertrudis cow that was at least 10 years old, and could 
also have exposed to BSE before the feed ban. This cow was 
euthanized by a private veterinarian, and it was buried on 
the farm after sampling. Both indigenous cattle were later 
found to have an atypical form of the BSE prion. These 
atypical forms, which have been found in some countries with 
intensified surveillance for prion diseases, might represent 
additional strains of BSE or spontaneously occurring prions. 
Relatively little is known about them. The OIE has classified 
the U.S. as a controlled risk country for BSE.
Monkeypox
in the United States
Veterinarians work to prevent, diagnose, and treat disease 
in a wide variety of species, but they also take on the role of 
gatekeeper to reduce disease transmission between humans 
and animals. Veterinarians need to have a knowledge of 
zoonotic diseases, and should question animal owners about 
illness if a zoonosis is suspected in animals or people. The 
2003 monkeypox outbreak demonstrates the importance of 
close cooperation between the medical, public health, and 
veterinary communities in addressing zoonotic diseases. It 
also illustrates how gaps in our knowledge of some diseases, 
particularly unusual diseases that have their reservoirs mainly 
in wildlife, can result in the introduction of a pathogen.
In May 2003, an unusual illness occurred in a three and 
a half-year-old Wisconsin child who had been bitten on 
the hands by an infected pet prairie dog. On May 11, the 
July of 2007, Canada introduced an enhanced feed ban which 
prohibits SRM from being incorporated into all animal feeds, 
pet foods, and fertilizers. Canada expects to detect a small 
number of BSE cases over the next 10 years as it progresses 
towards its goal of eliminating BSE from the national herd.
Consistent with OIE guidelines, Canada’s current investigation 
practices include trace-out of any animals born on the farm of 
origin 12 months before or after the affected animal, as well as 
an investigation of how the animal may have become infected, 
which includes feeding practices and purchases on the premises. 
Live animals identified through trace out are permanently 
identified and their movements controlled. Their carcasses are 
completely destroyed at slaughter or death. The OIE no longer 
recommends including the offspring of infected cattle in BSE 
investigations because vertical transmission is not a scientifically 
recognized pathway of BSE spread. However, Canada 
takes appropriate measures to meet the export certification 
requirements of countries that prohibit the importation of such 
animals. In 2007, the OIE categorized Canada as a controlled 
risk country for BSE in recognition of the effectiveness of 
Canada’s surveillance, risk mitigation, and eradication measures. 
After the first case of BSE was diagnosed in Canada, the U.S. 
closed its border to the importation of live Canadian cattle and 
their products. The border was subsequently opened to cattle 
under 30 months of age destined for immediate slaughter or 
restricted feedlots. Currently, any bovine born in Canada on or 
after March 1, 1999, the date that the U.S. recognizes as the 
effective date for Canada’s ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban, is 
eligible for importation.
BSE in the United States
To prevent BSE from entering the United States, restrictions 
were placed on the importation of live ruminants and 
certain ruminant products from BSE-infected countries in 
1989. These restrictions were later extended to include the 
importation of ruminants and certain ruminant products 
from all European countries. In August 1997, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) banned the feeding of most 
mammalian proteins to ruminants. 
Active surveillance efforts by the USDA Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) were instituted in May 
1990. As a result of this surveillance, BSE was found in a 
Holstein dairy cow in Washington State in December 2003. 
The cow had been imported from Canada in September 2001, 
along with 81 others. Samples were taken from 255 animals 
located on farms in the U.S. where cows from the index herd 
in Canada were being raised. All tested negative to BSE. In 
response to this case, the USDA banned the use of certain 
bovine tissues in human foods and made extensive changes 
in slaughter and processing facilities to reduce the risks to 
human health. In addition, APHIS undertook an intensified 
testing program to determine whether BSE currently exists 
in U.S. cattle and at what level. This surveillance is targeted 
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child’s family had acquired two prairie dogs from a pet swap 
meet. Two days after they were purchased, and on the same 
day it bit the little girl, one of the prairie dogs developed 
lymphadenopathy, papular skin lesions, and an ocular 
discharge. The prairie dog was examined at a veterinary clinic 
on May 15. The following day, the child developed a fever 
and the wound became reddened. On May 20, she had raised 
whitish lesions and was taken to a physician, who began 
treatment with antibiotics. The prairie dog died the same day. 
Its head was submitted for rabies testing, which was negative. 
A lymph node was also sent to the Marshfield Laboratory in 
Wisconsin for bacterial culture, but no bacterial pathogens 
that could account for the child’s symptoms were found. Two 
days later, the child was referred to the Marshfield Clinic, 
where she was hospitalized with fever, swelling around the 
eye, festering skin wounds, and new skin lesions on her scalp, 
extremities, and perineum. 
On May 26, the child’s mother became ill with fever, sweats, 
malaise, and a sore throat, as well as vesicles at the site of a cat 
scratch. Marshfield Laboratory scientists performed electron 
microscopy on a skin biopsy from the mother, revealing the 
presence of a poxvirus, an unusual finding. The laboratory 
informed the Wisconsin Public Health Department (PHD) 
of its findings on June 2. On the same day, the Wisconsin 
PHD also received a report of an unusual illness from the 
Milwaukee Health Department. A Wisconsin meat inspector 
who distributed exotic animals had been bitten and scratched 
by a prairie dog on May 18. He later developed a skin nodule 
at the site of the scratch, followed several days later by a 
fever, lymphadenopathy, chills, and sweats. By May 31, his 
condition had worsened to the point that he was hospitalized. 
An investigation revealed that the pet prairie dog that had 
bitten the child was bought from this distributor. 
At the same time, other cases of an unusual illness with a 
vesiculopustular rash were being reported in Wisconsin. 
On June 4, Marshfield Laboratory scientists informed the 
Wisconsin PHD that electron microscopy had detected 
an orthopoxvirus in tissues from both the prairie dog 
and the child’s mother. The following day, the Wisconsin 
PHD organized a teleconference between physicians and 
representatives from federal, state, and local agencies. Images 
of the lesions and viruses found by the Marshfield Clinic were 
placed on the Internet, and plans were quickly made to ship 
specimens to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) Poxvirus Laboratory. On June 6, the CDC analyzed 
samples from three patients by PCR, and found evidence 
of monkeypox virus. The following day, sequencing at the 
CDC confirmed that the samples contained a monkeypox 
gene, and on June 6, monkeypox virus was found in a virus 
culture of the prairie dog’s lymph node. An epidemiological 
investigation revealed that 11 people including the exotic 
pet distributor, his wife, members of the public who bought 
prairie dogs, two veterinarians who had treated prairie dogs, 
and employees of two different pet shops had symptoms 
consistent with monkeypox. On June 7, 2003, public health 
officials from the CDC and the states of Wisconsin, Illinois, 
and Indiana reported the first outbreak of human monkeypox 
outside Africa.
What is Monkeypox?
Monkeypox is a rare, zoonotic viral disease that occurs 
primarily in the rain forests of Central and West Africa. In 
Africa, the monkeypox virus circulates in unknown animal 
hosts and emerges periodically as a zoonosis in humans. 
Outbreaks have also been seen occasionally among captive 
nonhuman primates in other parts of the world. With the 
exception of primates, few of the natural hosts of this virus 
were known in 2003; however, a variety of rodents and other 
small mammals are now recognized to be susceptible. Two 
genera of African squirrels, Funisciurus spp. (rope squirrels) 
and Heliosciurus spp. (sun squirrels), have been suggested as 
possible reservoir hosts. Other susceptible species include 
Gambian giant pouched rats, dormice, African hedgehogs, 
North American black-tailed prairie dogs, ground squirrels, 
groundhogs/woodchucks, and opossums. 
Humans are usually exposed to the monkeypox virus via 
infected animals. This virus may be transmitted to people in 
animal bites, in aerosols during close contact, or by direct 
contact with lesions, blood, or body fluids. In Africa, human 
outbreaks have often been linked to handling, preparing, and 
eating wild animals. In the U.S., most cases occurred among 
people who had close direct contact with captive prairie 
dogs; some infections were apparently acquired in scratches 
and bites, or through open wounds. Human–to–human 
transmission can also occur. 
In people, monkeypox resembles smallpox, but the symptoms 
are generally milder and, unlike smallpox, the lymph nodes 
are usually enlarged. The initial symptoms are flu–like, 
and are followed by a maculopapular rash. The skin lesions 
become vesicles and pustules (“pocks”), which umbilicate, 
Prairie dogs housed in close proximity to imported Gambian rats and dormice 
became infected with monkeypox virus.
Source: www.gettyimages.com 
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before systemic signs developed. Two patients, both children, 
had serious illnesses. One child developed encephalitis, an 
unusual complication. The other child had generalized lesions 
including some in the throat, and severe cervical and tonsillar 
lymphadenopathy, which caused difficulty in breathing and 
swallowing. An adult developed complications of keratitis 
and corneal ulceration, and received a corneal transplant. 
However, this outbreak was unusual in that no human deaths 
were reported. The strain that entered the U.S. was a West 
African virus. This factor, together with the availability of 
advanced health care facilities and good supportive care, as 
well as the absence of poor nutrition and concurrent diseases, 
may account for the relative mildness of the outbreak.
The CDC recommended that people who had close or intimate 
contact with a confirmed case be vaccinated with the smallpox 
vaccine. Seven people, including three veterinarians, two 
laboratory workers, and two health-care workers received pre-
exposure prophylaxis. Another 23 people were vaccinated after 
exposure. The CDC also issued procedures to medical workers 
and veterinarians on preventing monkeypox transmission.
Clinical cases were also reported in some animals. In prairie 
dogs, blepharoconjunctivitis was often the first sign. Other 
clinical signs included fever, coughing, sneezing, oral ulcers, 
nasal discharge, respiratory distress, lymphadenopathy, and a 
nodular rash. Some prairie dogs died and others apparently 
recovered. Fatal infections were also reported among rope 
squirrels, dormice, and one Gambian giant pouched rat, while 
another Gambian rat had mild clinical signs and limited skin 
lesions, and some Gambian rats appeared healthy but were 
seropositive. Veterinarians who suspected monkeypox in an 
animal were asked to contact the state health department 
for information on specimen submission. They were advised 
not to perform necropsies or biopsies because of the risk of 
infection. The CDC recommended that all animals with 
suspected monkeypox be humanely euthanized to prevent the 
further spread of the disease and the carcasses be incinerated. 
If the animal was associated with a human case, it was tested 
to confirm the disease. In addition, the CDC recommended 
that all rodents from the April 9 shipment, and any prairie 
dogs on the premises at the same time as these African 
rodents, be euthanized. Because so little was known about 
the susceptibility of most species, other mammals that had 
been in contact with infected animals were placed under 
quarantine for six weeks.
On June 11, 2003, the CDC and the FDA issued a joint 
order announcing an immediate embargo on the importation 
of all rodents from Africa. The joint order also banned within 
the U.S. the sale, distribution, transport, or release into the 
environment, of prairie dogs and six genera of African rodents 
implicated in the monkeypox outbreak. On November 3, 
2003, the joint order was replaced by an interim final rule 
in which the CDC restricts importation of these animals 
and the FDA restricts domestic interstate and intrastate 
movement, with exemption procedures to accommodate 
form scabs and are eventually shed. The number of skin 
lesions varies from fewer than 25 to more than a hundred. 
Confluent rashes and recurrent febrile periods can occur in 
severe cases. Subclinical and very mild cases are also seen. 
Two clades of monkeypox viruses, the West African and 
Congo Basin (Central Africa) viruses, have been identified. 
The Congo Basin viruses are more virulent. Although most 
patients survive in West Africa, 10-17 percent of the cases in 
the Congo Basin are reported to be fatal. 
How did Monkeypox Get to the United States?
In the U.S. outbreak, traceback investigations found that the 
source of the infection was a shipment of animals from Ghana 
imported into Texas on April 9. This shipment contained 
hundreds of small mammals including six species of African 
rodents. Some of these animals had reportedly become ill and 
died suddenly, soon after their arrival in the U.S. The CDC 
tested some of the surviving animals and found monkeypox 
virus in Gambian giant pouched rats, rope squirrels, and 
dormice. Infections were also documented in other captive 
species including a groundhog/woodchuck, an African 
hedgehog, a jerboa, and two opossums. Species that developed 
antibodies after exposure, but had no evidence of viral DNA 
or infectious virus included chinchillas and coatimundis. 
Many other species were exposed to the infected animals, but 
did not become seropositive. 
Before the outbreak was detected, the monkeypox virus had 
spread into several states in these animals and in prairie dogs. 
Some of the imported animals were shipped from Texas to 
an Iowa distributor and then to a distributor in Illinois. In 
Illinois, the Gambian rats and dormice were kept in close 
proximity to North American black-tailed prairie dogs, which 
were highly susceptible to this virus. The prairie dogs were 
then sold to other dealers and individuals in several states, 
including the Milwaukee animal distributor, who bought 
prairie dogs and a Gambian giant rat. In May, some prairie 
dogs were sold to two pet shops in the Milwaukee area, and 
others were sold or traded at the pet “swap meet” in northern 
Wisconsin. All of the exposed prairie dogs could not be traced 
during the investigation.
The CDC advised physicians, veterinarians, and the public 
to report instances of rash illness associated with exposure 
to prairie dogs, Gambian rats, or other animals to local 
and state public health authorities. In total, 37 laboratory-
confirmed and 35 suspected human cases, all infected by 
exposure to captive prairie dogs, were reported in Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Ohio. Most 
people in the U.S. had a fairly mild form of the disease, 
with less marked lymphadenopathy than reported in Africa, 
relatively few lesions, and a self-limiting course. In many 
patients, the skin lesions were localized and confined to the 
extremities; generalized rash was rare. Skin lesions sometimes 
occurred at a bite or scratch, the apparent inoculation site, 
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special circumstances. No human cases of monkeypox have 
been reported in the U.S. since June 22, 2003, and there is no 
evidence that the virus became endemic in North American 
pets or wildlife populations.
Influenza Viruses 
and Their Changing Host Relationships
Viruses rarely jump from one species into another. When 
they do, the outbreak tends to be brief; typically, the virus is 
poorly adapted to the new host and cannot be transmitted 
efficiently. Two characteristics of influenza A viruses – their 
high mutation rate and their ability to recombine with each 
other – help them adapt to new hosts. Since the 1990s, some 
H5N1 avian influenza viruses have revealed an unexpected 
capacity to cause severe disease in mammals and wild birds, 
equine influenza viruses have jumped into dogs for the first 
time, and swine influenza viruses have contributed gene 
segments to a new influenza virus causing a human pandemic. 
Preventing the establishment of these changeable viruses in 
animal or human populations requires regular surveillance 
and awareness of their potential.
What are Influenza A viruses and How Do 
They Jump From One Species to Another?
Influenza viruses belong to three genera in the Orthomyxo-
virus family. Viruses in the genus influenzavirus A, which are 
also known as influenza A viruses, circulate in birds, humans, 
pigs, horses, and recently in dogs. The viruses that are usually 
found in each species are known, respectively, as avian 
influenza viruses, human influenza viruses, swine influenza 
viruses, equine influenza viruses, and canine influenza viruses. 
Waterfowl and shorebirds seem to be the reservoirs for the 
influenza A viruses; these birds carry a tremendous variety 
of viruses, but very rarely become ill themselves. Relatively 
few influenza A viruses have become established in each 
mammalian species.
Influenza A viruses are classified into subtypes based on two 
proteins, the hemagglutinin (‘H’) and neuraminidase (‘N’). 
There are at least 16 different hemagglutinin proteins (H1 
to H16) and 9 neuraminidase proteins (N1 to N9). Because 
the influenza viruses are highly variable, viruses that share 
a subtype are not necessarily closely related and may differ 
greatly in their virulence, host specificity, or other factors. 
For example, one virus with the subtype H1N1 is a human 
influenza virus, another is a swine influenza virus, and others 
are found only in birds. Waterfowl and shorebirds carry 
many different influenza A subtypes. In contrast, only a 
few subtypes circulate in each species of mammal. Equine 
influenza viruses, for example, belong to the subtypes H3N8 
and H7N7. 
Influenza viruses are able to jump from one species to 
another. This is generally a rare event, although it seems to 
happen somewhat more often in swine, which have receptors 
for both avian and mammalian influenza viruses. Species 
jumps are aided by the influenza virus’ tendency to change 
quickly. Due to poor proofreading during gene replication, 
influenza viruses can quickly accumulate small mutations, a 
process called ‘antigenic drift.’ In addition, they can exchange 
genes with other influenza viruses, an ability facilitated by 
their segmented genome. If two influenza viruses infect a 
cell simultaneously, the segments may mix when new virus 
particles are assembled. An influenza virus can ‘reassort’ with 
any other influenza virus, regardless of its origin. For example, 
if a cell is infected by a swine influenza virus and a human 
influenza virus, the new viruses budding from that cell might 
contain some pieces from the swine influenza virus and 
other pieces from the human influenza virus—a process that 
could help the swine virus infect human cells. Sometimes, 
TRANSMISSIONS
Influenza A viruses may cross species barriers
occasionally. In most cases, they fail to become
established and do not spread in the new species.
INFLUENZA INTERSPECIES TRANSMISSION
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an influenza virus can also infect a different species without 
reassortment. Usually, the virus is poorly adapted to the new 
species, cannot be transmitted efficiently, and quickly dies 
out. Occasionally, a virus is able to replicate and spread well 
in the new hosts, and a permanent jump is made. 
Recently, the world has seen several examples of changing 
relationships between influenza viruses and their hosts. The 
first occurred when highly virulent H5N1 avian influenza 
viruses caused epizootics in poultry, and some of these viruses 
revealed an unexpected capacity to cause severe disease in 
mammals including humans, as well as in wild waterfowl.
H5N1 Avian Influenza Epizootics
Low and High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Poultry 
Although many wild birds, particularly waterfowl and 
shorebirds, are infected with avian influenza viruses, these 
viruses are usually carried asymptomatically. In poultry, 
however, influenza viruses regularly cause disease. The viruses 
that cause serious illness in poultry, or carry the genetic 
potential to do so, are known as “high pathogenicity avian 
influenza (HPAI) viruses.” Flocks infected with these viruses 
usually have severe clinical signs, and up to 90-100% of the 
birds may die. All other avian influenza viruses, which are 
associated with much milder clinical signs or asymptomatic 
infections in poultry, are known as “low pathogenicity avian 
influenza (LPAI) viruses.” All HPAI viruses that have been 
detected so far carry the H5 or H7 hemagglutinin; LPAI viruses 
can be of any subtype. For example, if an H3N2, H2N1 or 
H8N5 virus is found in a chicken, it is almost certain to be an 
LPAI virus; however, an H5N1 virus might be either LPAI or 
HPAI, and this can be determined only by testing it. H5 and 
H7 LPAI viruses can mutate into HPAI viruses when they are 
circulating among poultry, which makes them a concern.
Outbreaks of high pathogenicity avian influenza occur 
periodically in poultry flocks throughout the world. HPAI 
viruses are often spread by poultry themselves, but outbreaks 
can also occur when viruses carried in wild birds are 
transmitted to poultry. Until recently, this almost always 
involved the transfer of an LPAI virus from wild birds to 
poultry, followed by reassortment with other avian influenza 
viruses and/or mutation of the virus to become an HPAI virus.
 
The Emergence of High Pathogenicity Asian 
Strain H5N1 Influenza Viruses
Many new isolates of avian influenza viruses come from 
southern China, where farmers often mix different species 
of terrestrial poultry, waterfowl, and pigs – a situation that 
allows influenza viruses from different species to acquire gene 
segments from each other. The island territory of Hong Kong, 
which imports large quantities of poultry from China, is 
considered to be a sentinel for these new viruses. Hong Kong 
maintains a comprehensive surveillance program that allows it 
Live bird markets are popular in Hong Kong.
Source: USDA
to detect and respond to new influenza viruses quickly. From 
1997 to 2002, Hong Kong experienced repeated outbreaks 
with various H5N1 influenza viruses. These disquieting 
outbreaks raised the suspicion that new, virulent reassortants 
of H5N1 were becoming established in the region. 
The first outbreak occurred in Hong Kong poultry flocks in 
1997. Before this epidemic, avian influenza viruses were not 
thought to cause serious disease in humans. Occasionally, 
conjunctivitis was reported among people who had been 
exposed to these viruses, but these infections seemed to be of  
little concern. The outbreak in Hong Kong, which began 
among poultry in late March, was caused by a strain of HPAI 
with the subtype H5N1. In May, an H5N1 avian influenza 
virus was isolated from a fatal case of acute pneumonia and 
respiratory distress syndrome in an otherwise healthy three-
year-old boy. This virus, which seemed to be transmitted  
to people by contact with sick birds, eventually killed five  
more Hong Kong residents and caused serious illness in 12 
others. The discovery that the H5N1/97 virus was pathogenic 
for humans added urgency to the eradication efforts. 
Approximately1.5 million chickens in live bird markets and 
farms were slaughtered in a successful bid to stop the epidemic. 
The H5N1 virus that caused this epidemic was a reassortant 
that contained genes from several different species of birds. One 
of the ‘parent’ viruses was an H5N1 virus from geese, while 
another segment was contributed by influenza viruses found 
mainly in quail. The reassortment between these viruses was 
probably facilitated by the mixing of bird species in Hong Kong’s 
many retail live bird markets. These markets, where poultry is 
bought live, and killed and plucked in front of the customer, 
are very popular among Hong Kong consumers. In 1997, the 
live bird markets contained waterfowl such as ducks and geese, 
and terrestrial birds such as chickens, quail, and guinea fowl. 
In addition to allowing new reassortant viruses to arise, these 
markets facilitate their spread; birds not sold at the market and 
returned to the farm may carry new infections with them.
To prevent the reemergence of another H5N1/97-like virus, 
Hong Kong established a central slaughterhouse for ducks 
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and geese in 1998. This measure was intended to keep the 
influenza viruses found in these aquatic poultry separate from 
other influenza viruses found in terrestrial birds. Terrestrial 
poultry—chickens, quail, pigeons, pheasants, and guinea 
fowl—continued to be sold and slaughtered in the retail live 
bird markets. After 1997, Hong Kong also established an 
elaborate system of blood tests, inspections, and quarantine 
rules to screen imported birds, as well as a surveillance system 
to test birds at the central slaughterhouse and in the live bird 
markets. Although the zoonotic H5N1 virus isolated in 1997 
was successfully eradicated from poultry, individual viruses 
containing its gene segments continued to circulate among 
birds in the region. 
Avian Influenza in Hong Kong, 1998-2002
After 1997, Hong Kong continued to maintain surveillance 
for new viruses and rapidly stamped out each outbreak. The 
poultry population of Hong Kong was partially or completely 
depopulated three times in five years. 
For a time, Hong Kong’s separation of terrestrial and aquatic 
poultry seemed to work. From 1999 to 2001, H5N1 viruses 
were intermittently isolated from geese and ducks at the 
central slaughterhouse, but no H5N1 viruses were found 
during routine surveillance in the live terrestrial poultry 
markets. Then in April 2001, H5N1 viruses were found in 
apparently healthy poultry in three of eight retail markets. 
There were no clinical signs of HPAI until mid-May, when 
three markets reported that the mortality rates in their poultry 
had increased greatly. More than a million birds in markets 
and on farms were euthanized to stop this outbreak, at a 
cost of nearly $4 million. This time, avian influenza viruses 
from waterfowl had been able to infect terrestrial poultry by 
reassorting with other waterfowl viruses. There were fears 
that such viruses might reassort with viruses still circulating 
among quail in the live bird markets, and produce another 
isolate that could infect humans. After the 2001 outbreak, 
Hong Kong authorities prohibited selling live quail where 
other poultry were sold in live bird markets. To interrupt 
the amplification of any viruses that might enter the retail 
markets, a once-a-month “rest-day” was also introduced. On 
these rest days, the live bird markets are completely emptied 
of poultry, any remaining poultry are slaughtered to be sold 
as chilled carcasses, and the markets are thoroughly cleaned 
before being restocked the following day.
Late in 2002, Hong Kong once again had an outbreak with 
H5N1 viruses—this time in wild birds at two nature parks. 
These viruses caused neurological signs in various resident 
waterfowl including geese, ducks, swans, and flamingos, and 
killed many of these birds. Terrestrial and feral birds at the 
parks, such as captive psittacine and passerine birds and free-
ranging pigeons, seemed to be unaffected. Both parks were 
closed, drained, and disinfected, and the surviving waterfowl 
were killed or quarantined. At the same time, H5N1 viruses 
were found in dead chickens in live bird markets and on a 
local chicken farm. H5N1 viruses were also isolated from 
dead egrets, herons, and other wild migratory birds that 
overwinter in Hong Kong. More than one virus seemed to be 
responsible for these outbreaks; at least three different H5N1 
viruses isolated in late 2002 were able to cause severe disease 
and death in experimentally infected ducks. 
Epidemics of avian influenza are very unusual in wild birds. 
These viruses seemed to be stable in their normal reservoir 
hosts. Before the 2002 H5N1 outbreak, researchers had seen 
little or no evolutionary change in the viruses isolated from 
wild waterfowl over the last 60 years. Earlier viruses found 
in Hong Kong, including the H5N1 virus isolated in 1997, 
did not replicate well in ducks and had been asymptomatic in 
waterfowl. The repeated outbreaks of H5N1 viruses in Hong 
Kong in 1997, 2001, and 2002 suggested that H5N1 viruses 
had become widespread in the region, and that new epidemic 
or epizootic strains might emerge through reassortment. 
During this time, there were also hints that viruses pathogenic 
to humans might be circulating in Mainland China. In 2003, 
an H5N1 virus was found in two members of a Hong Kong 
family who had traveled to China. The five-year-old son 
recovered, but his father died. Another family member died of 
a respiratory illness while in China, but was not tested for the 
virus.
Avian Influenza in Southeast Asia, Europe, 
and Africa, 2003-2009
In 2003, a new outbreak occurred. This time, it was 
widespread. From late 2003 to March 2004, HPAI (H5N1) 
viruses were reported among poultry, particularly chickens, in 
a number of countries in Asia. More than 100 million birds 
died or were culled in an effort to stop the epizootic. In rare 
instances, this virus was able to infect humans. Thirty-five 
human cases were confirmed in Thailand and Vietnam. Most 
were the result of direct contact with birds. In many parts of 
Southeast Asia, people live in close contact with their animals, 
including poultry, facilitating the spread of zoonotic pathogens. 
The human cases were severe, and 24 of the 35 infections 
were fatal. By March 2004, eradication efforts seemed to have 
contained the poultry epizootic, and human infections were 
no longer being reported in most nations. However, beginning 
in June 2004, Asian countries once again began seeing HPAI 
in poultry. Human cases were again reported. Vaccination of 
poultry was used with success in some countries, resulting in 
a reduction in the number of human cases. Although at times 
this epidemic appeared to be under control, eradication was 
never complete. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) warned that the H5N1 virus seemed to 
have become endemic among birds in Asia. 
In 2005, H5N1 viruses spread beyond Southeast Asia. They 
were first reported in Russia and Kazakhstan. Authorities in 
these countries hoped to confine the virus to Asia by intensive 
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1925, was associated with live bird markets. HPAI was seen 
again in 1929, either as a new outbreak caused by the same 
virus or as a new introduction. This disease was not reported 
again until 1983, when an H5N2 virus caused an extensive 
epidemic in Pennsylvania and the surrounding states. This virus 
was very similar to an LPAI virus that had been circulating in 
the area for six months. As a result, some birds had immunity 
to the HPAI virus, which complicated diagnosis and probably 
helped the virus spread further. Control and eradication of 
this epizootic, which was not completed until 1984, cost over 
$63 million in federal funds and an additional $350 million 
in increased consumer costs. In 2004, a different H5N2 HPAI 
virus was isolated from a south-central Texas broiler chicken 
flock that supplied live bird markets. This virus did not cause 
severe disease in chickens; however, its genetic makeup, which 
suggested that it had the potential to do so, caused it to be 
classified as an HPAI virus. As a result, the USDA and state of 
Texas culled the birds in the flock. Events such as these have 
raised awareness of the potential for LPAI viruses to mutate 
to HPAI viruses. All H5 and H7 viruses, whether classified as 
HPAI or LPAI, are now reportable to the OIE.
Before 2004, Canada had not reported a case of HPAI to 
the OIE but, in March 2004, HPAI was identified in British 
Columbia and in September 2007, in Saskatchewan. Both 
outbreaks are thought to have been introduced into poultry 
from wild birds. These two outbreaks followed very different 
courses, primarily due to the differences in the poultry 
industry in the two regions, i.e., highly concentrated in British 
Columbia and widely distributed in Saskatchewan. In March 
2004, HPAI (H7N3) was detected in birds from a commercial 
chicken breeder farm in British Columbia’s Fraser Valley. LPAI 
(H7) had been found in older poultry from this same farm 
approximately three weeks earlier. By mid-May, birds on 42 
commercial and 11 backyard premises in the Fraser Valley 
were declared infected with HPAI. Although not proven, it is 
thought that LPAI was introduced into the older flock on the 
index farm by wild waterfowl and that the virus then mutated 
to HPAI strain, which subsequently infected younger poultry 
on the same farm and spread to other farms. To control this 
outbreak, approximately 17 million commercial poultry were 
depopulated at a total cost of 80.7 million in Canadian dollars. 
It is estimated that the poultry industry in British Columbia 
suffered losses of between 222 and 252 million in Canadian 
dollars in sales and production margin losses. The virus in this 
outbreak also caused human disease. Although a number of 
exposed or potentially exposed individuals reported symptoms 
of influenza-like illness and/or conjunctivitis, only two of 
these individuals were ultimately confirmed as being infected 
with the H7N3 strain of avian influenza. In late September 
of 2007, HPAI (H7N3) was detected on a broiler hatching-
egg operation in southern Saskatchewan. The affected poultry 
operation was located in a major wild bird breeding area 
related to the Central and Mississippi flyways. A freshwater 
dugout located on the premises was used as a secondary water 
source for the poultry. It was hypothesized that the influenza 
virus in this outbreak was introduced through contaminated 
eradication efforts, but within a few weeks, an Asian strain 
H5N1 virus passed the Ural Mountains, the boundary 
between Europe and Asia, and appeared in Turkey and 
Romania, prompting mass culls. The outbreaks continued to 
smolder and spread, and eventually Asian strain H5N1 viruses 
reached other parts of Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle 
East. Although some countries have been able to eradicate the 
virus, new outbreaks continue to occur each year.
The Asian H5N1 strains responsible for this epidemic have 
a disquieting ability to cause serious disease in species other 
than poultry. As of July 2009, they have been responsible for 
approximately 430 human infections, generally as the result 
of close contact with poultry; about 60% of these cases were 
fatal. These H5N1 viruses have also caused disease in other 
mammals including tigers, leopards, housecats, dogs, palm 
civets, and stone martens. In addition, numerous deaths have 
been reported in migratory wild birds, which usually carry 
avian influenza viruses asymptomatically, and lethal infections 
have been reported in songbirds. There are fears that an avian 
H5N1 virus could eventually become adapted to humans, 
resulting in a severe human pandemic. Recombination 
between an avian H5N1 virus and a human influenza virus 
might facilitate such an event. Because the human population 
does not have immunity to H5N1 (the currently circulating 
human influenza viruses are H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2), a 
human-adapted H5N1 virus might spread rapidly and widely. 
Reports of sustained person-to-person transmission would 
be a signal that the H5N1 virus is adapting to humans. As of 
July 2009, there have been no reports of such an event, and 
no evidence that any H5N1 viruses have recombined with 
human influenza viruses. 
The Discovery of Other Zoonotic Avian 
Influenza Viruses
Awareness that avian influenza viruses can cause serious disease 
in people has led to the recognition of zoonotic infections 
with other subtypes of these viruses. Between 1997 and 2009, 
sporadic human infections were reported with various H7 
viruses and H9N2 viruses. Most zoonotic infections with non-
H5N1 viruses have been limited to conjunctivitis or relatively 
mild respiratory disease, but rare severe or fatal infections 
have also been seen. Human cases mainly seem to result from 
direct contact with infected poultry, although rare instances of 
limited person-to-person transmission have been documented. 
These discoveries have increased zoonotic concerns about all 
HPAI outbreaks among poultry.
High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza  
in the U.S. and Canada
High pathogenicity avian influenza is a foreign animal disease 
in both the U.S. and Canada. Only three or four outbreaks 
have been recorded in the U.S. since 1900. The first, in 1924-
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drinking water from the dugout, or through farm workers and 
wild animals. Poultry operations are widely distributed in this 
area, and the infection remained confined to the index farm. 
No zoonotic infections were reported in this outbreak.
U.S. and Canadian Efforts to Exclude H5N1 
and Other HPAI Viruses
Like other countries, the U.S. and Canada are concerned 
that the Asian strain H5N1 viruses could enter domesticated 
poultry flocks or wild birds. In the U.S., APHIS has re-
examined its HPAI prevention and eradication plans in 
light of that epidemic. All imported birds must now be 
quarantined and tested for avian influenza viruses before 
they enter the country. In addition, APHIS has placed trade 
restrictions on the importation of poultry or poultry products 
from countries that have reported cases of HPAI. APHIS 
has alerted the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
to be particularly vigilant in its agricultural inspections 
of passengers and cargo from Asia, and has increased its 
surveillance of domestic markets for illegally imported poultry 
products. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, together 
with APHIS and state wildlife agencies, is conducting 
surveillance for HPAI viruses in wild birds. In addition, 
the USDA is working with the OIE, the United Nations’ 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and World 
Health Organization (WHO) to help affected countries and 
their neighbors with disease prevention, management, and 
eradication to reduce the global threat from this virus. 
Canada is closely monitoring global avian influenza 
developments, particularly the spread of the Asian H5N1 
strain. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in 
collaboration with other government agencies, has put in 
place safeguards to limit the introduction and spread of avian 
influenza. These safeguards include enhanced surveillance, 
enhanced biosecurity, import controls, and emergency 
preparedness. Canada has two surveillance programs, one 
targeting wild birds and the other domestic poultry. In 
2006, over 12,000 birds were tested through the wild bird 
surveillance program; there were no findings of HPAI 
including the Asian strain of H5N1. In light of the increased 
risk of avian influenza, the CFIA has focused attention on 
protecting domestic poultry through effective use of on farm 
biosecurity measures. In the case of commercial flocks the 
CFIA promotes best practices and provides technical advice 
to ensure that the most effective and uniform practices are 
used across the industry. In cooperation with the provinces 
and territories, the CFIA has created an awareness campaign 
to inform smaller producers of the best biosecurity practices. 
Canada now prohibits trade in poultry, poultry products, and 
birds from any country until domestic poultry in that country 
are proven free of HPAI. New quarantine and inspection 
requirements have also been implemented for countries 
recognized free of HPAI. In addition to the processes in place 
to prevent introduction of avian influenza, Canada has also 
enhanced its efforts towards responding to an outbreak. These 
enhancements include the formation of dedicated emergency 
response teams, development of detailed procedures for 
response in the case of an outbreak, use of avian influenza 
scenarios and exercises, development of partnerships 
with other levels of government and external bodies, and 
identification of personnel and equipment that could be 
required to provide surge capacity in the case of an outbreak.
H3N8 and the Canine Influenza Virus
While there is no sign that avian H5N1 viruses are becoming 
adapted to replicate among humans, an H3N8 equine 
influenza virus recently made a successful jump into dogs. This 
is the first canine influenza virus that has ever been reported.
In January 2004, 22 racing greyhounds at a Florida racetrack 
became ill with an unknown respiratory disease. Fourteen of 
the dogs developed a fever, followed by a persistent cough that 
lasted for 10 to 14 days. These dogs recovered. Eight other dogs 
died suddenly with signs of severe hemorrhagic pneumonia. 
Using lung tissue samples from the dead dogs, researchers 
discovered an influenza A virus that was very similar to an 
H3N8 equine influenza virus that circulates in horses. No 
influenza virus had ever become established in dogs before. 
Serology using paired acute and convalescent sera demonstrated 
that the recovered dogs had also been infected by this virus. 
It soon became apparent that the canine influenza virus had 
been circulating among U.S. greyhound populations for several 
years, and possibly as early as 1999. The evidence suggests that 
an H3N8 equine influenza virus was probably transmitted 
whole from horses to dogs, as a one-time event. There are four 
amino acid differences between the hemagglutinin proteins 
in the equine and canine viruses; these changes were probably 
important in adapting the virus to dogs.
Although canine influenza continued to be reported among 
greyhounds in a number of states, this virus did not seem to 
Canine influenza was first identified in racing greyhounds.
Source: www.gettyimages.com
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to which people have little or no immunity emerges and 
spreads efficiently from person to person. In the 20th century, 
pandemics were caused by an H1N1 virus in 1918 (Spanish 
flu), an H2N2 virus in 1957 (Asian flu), and an H3N2 virus 
in 1968 (Hong Kong flu). All three viruses contained at least 
some genes from influenza viruses found in animals, and in 
all three cases, the hemagglutinin genes originally came from 
avian influenza viruses. The Asian flu and Hong Kong flu 
viruses were reassortants that had recombined with human 
influenza viruses.
On April 21, 2009, the CDC reported that H1N1 swine 
influenza infections had been found in two children in 
California. The cases were diagnosed as the result of routine 
surveillance for influenza viruses, when isolates that were 
untypeable as any known human influenza virus were 
forwarded to specialized laboratories for further analysis. 
Although both children had mild symptoms, the infections 
concerned public health officials. Neither child had any 
history of contact with pigs, which suggested that they might 
have been infected by person-to-person transmission. Other 
members of their families had also been ill with influenza-like 
illnesses. Soon afterward, six more confirmed infections with 
this virus were reported in California and Texas. 
At about the same time, it became apparent that an ongoing 
outbreak of respiratory disease in Mexico was caused by the same 
virus. In April, reports of an unexpected number of respiratory 
illnesses, including serious atypical pneumonia, began to concern 
Mexican officials. Mexican authorities sent clinical samples 
with an unusual influenza virus to the Public Health Agency 
of Canada (PHAC). On April 23, the PHAC reported the 
isolation of a swine-origin H1N1 virus from these samples. A 
retrospective survey revealed nearly 2,000 human cases that may 
have been caused by this virus between March 1 and April 30. 
The illness appeared to be widespread throughout Mexico. 
At first, surveillance in other countries focused on travelers who 
had been to Mexico. The novel H1N1 virus was identified in 
the U.S. and Canada, and soon afterward, among travelers in 
other countries. As surveillance increased, cases of person-
to-person spread were also revealed. By May 13, this virus 
had been officially reported in 33 countries, with at least 
5,700 known cases and 61 deaths. Most of the first cases 
were reported from North America, with the vast majority of 
the deaths in Mexico. The virus spread quickly, and in June, 
the World Health Organization declared a pandemic. By 
September, more than 29,000 laboratory-confirmed cases in 
countries around the world and at least 3400 deaths had been 
reported to the WHO. Many additional mild infections have 
probably occurred. Overall, the rate of serious illness from this 
virus, as of Fall 2009, appears to be similar to human seasonal 
influenza. However, severe or fatal cases have been reported  
in some healthy young people, as well as pregnant women  
and individuals with underlying health conditions. Some 
populations, including aboriginal communities in Canada, 
have been disproportionately affected by the novel H1N1 virus.
be a threat to other breeds of dogs at first. Experimentally 
infected beagles developed a fever, but no respiratory signs. 
However, since that time, cases of H3N8 canine influenza 
has been reported in a variety of breeds at veterinary clinics, 
animal shelters, pet stores, and boarding kennels in the U.S. 
All dogs regardless of breed or age are now considered to be 
susceptible. One study suggests that canine influenza is rare, 
if it exists at all, in Canada. In the province of Ontario, a 
survey found antibodies to the H3N8 virus in only one of 
225 dogs in 2006. This dog was a greyhound that had come 
from a racetrack in Florida, and may have been infected there. 
It had no recent history of respiratory disease, and there has 
been no additional evidence of canine influenza in Ontario or 
elsewhere in Canada. 
Canine influenza is an emerging disease in dogs, which are 
not expected to have any immunity to influenza viruses. In 
kennels, the infection rate may reach 100 percent, and clinical 
signs often occur in 60-80 percent of the dogs infected. 
Most dogs are expected to develop a relatively mild form 
of the disease, which is characterized by a cough that may 
persist for weeks in spite of treatment. Many dogs recover 
spontaneously. Occasionally, the cough is accompanied by 
a fever and/or a nasal discharge that appears to be caused by 
secondary bacterial invaders, and responds to antibiotics. A 
few dogs develop more severe disease with signs of pneumonia 
or bronchopneumonia. Peracute deaths with evidence of 
hemorrhages in the respiratory tract have been reported among 
racing greyhounds, but this syndrome seems to be rare or 
nonexistent in pets. The mortality rate is thought to be 1-5 
percent, and deaths mainly occur in dogs with the more severe 
syndromes. Secondary bacterial infections appear to contribute 
significantly to these deaths. In 2009, a USDA licensed 
vaccine for canine influenza became available in the US.
There is no evidence that any other species, including 
humans, can be infected by the new canine influenza virus. 
However, some experts are concerned that, due to their 
close associations with humans, dogs might become a 
source of novel influenza virus transmission to humans. As 
a precaution, physicians, veterinarians, and others have been 
asked to report any cases of human influenza that seem to be 
linked to exposure to canine influenza.
The H1N1 Swine Origin Influenza Virus
Although there has been some concern that the canine 
influenza virus might be able to reassort with human 
influenza viruses, as well as significant fear that the next 
human influenza pandemic might be caused by an avian 
H5N1 virus or a reassortant of this virus, the first pandemic 
of the 21st century came from a different source – a novel 
H1N1 virus that was produced by reassortment between two 
or more swine influenza viruses. 
Influenza pandemics (widespread epidemics) can occur in the 
human population when a virus with a hemagglutinin protein 
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Where Did the New H1N1 Virus Come From?
The novel H1N1 virus contains gene segments from three swine 
influenza viruses - a Eurasian H1N1 virus, a North American 
H3N2 triple reassortant virus, and the H1N1 ‘classical’ swine 
influenza virus. This particular combination of gene segments 
has not been found previously among pigs or people, except 
those affected by the 2009 outbreak. Genetic analysis suggests 
that this virus was probably transmitted to people as either 
a single event or as multiple events involving very similar 
viruses, and that it probably occurred fairly recently. It is 
possible that the ancestors of this virus are circulating among 
pigs in some part of the world; however, as of October 2009, 
these viruses have not been detected in any country where 
surveillance for swine influenza viruses is conducted regularly.
Swine influenza viruses are very common in pigs throughout 
the world. Pigs seem to acquire new influenza viruses fairly 
readily, but all of these viruses do not become established in 
swine populations, and some disappear after a time. Many 
swine influenza viruses have gene segments from human 
or avian influenza viruses, acquired by reassortment. Some 
human and avian influenza viruses have also been transferred 
“whole” into pig populations. Some of the most changeable 
viruses in pigs are triple reassortant H3N2 swine influenza 
viruses, which appeared in North America late in the 1990s 
through reassortment between a human H3N2 influenza 
virus, an avian influenza virus, and the classical H1N1 swine 
influenza virus. The latter virus had been circulating among 
pigs for decades with relatively little change in its genome, 
and is related to H1N1 human influenza viruses. The triple 
reassortant H3N2 viruses tend to recombine fairly readily 
with other viruses, producing new variants with a different 
hemagglutinin and/or neuraminidase.
Infections with various swine influenza viruses are reported 
sporadically among people who have contact with pigs. Many 
cases are clinically indistinguishable from human seasonal 
influenza, but a few fatal infections have been reported in 
people who were not expected to be at high risk for severe 
disease. Although swine influenza viruses have occasionally 
been transmitted to a few close contacts, there is usually no 
sustained transmission of these viruses in people. One incident 
with more extensive person-to-person transmission occurred 
in the 1970s during an outbreak at a military base in Fort 
Dix, New Jersey, raising fears of a human pandemic with a 
swine influenza strain. However, the virus in this outbreak 
disappeared from the military base and never spread to the 
general population. 
The Swine Origin H1N1 Virus in Pigs, 
Turkeys and Other Animals
Early evidence suggests that pigs have limited immunity to 
the novel swine-origin H1N1 virus. The novel H1N1 virus 
has sporadically entered pig farms since the human outbreaks 
began and surveillance was initiated in swine. In a number 
of cases, these viruses seem to have been transmitted to pigs 
from people. Outbreaks in pigs have been characterized by 
mild respiratory disease but a few pregnant animals have 
aborted. The morbidity rate has been as high as 90 percent in 
some herds, but deaths have been rare. 
Turkeys are infected fairly often with swine influenza viruses. 
Turkeys infected with these viruses usually develop respiratory 
disease, have decreased egg production, or produce abnormal 
eggs. The novel H1N1 virus has been reported in turkeys 
on a few farms in Chile, Canada and the U.S. Decreased 
egg production was the principal sign of disease. In Chile, 
approximately 61 percent of the flock was affected, but no 
birds died. Mild to severe illness has also been recognized in a 
few ferrets, cats and dogs, as well as a cheetah in a zoo. Some 
cases in cats and ferrets were fatal.
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What Does the Future Hold?
Severe pandemics such as the 1918 Spanish flu can occur in 
waves as the virus adapts to humans. Whether such waves will 
occur, and whether more virulent strains of the novel H1N1 
influenza virus will emerge is unknown. Most people appear 
to have little or no immunity to this new virus. A human 
vaccine is expected to help interrupt transmission. Similarly to 
previous pandemic viruses, the swine-origin H1N1 virus will 
probably continue to circulate among human populations, at 
least for a time. As such viruses become well established among 
people, they become typical seasonal human influenza viruses 
and are controlled by annual flu vaccines. Several swine herds 
have also been infected, suggesting that this virus is readily 
transmissible in pigs and a panzootic is possible in this species. 
There seems to be little or no threat to humans from this 
source, particularly as the virus is already being transmitted 
widely among people. In addition, influenza viruses are readily 
killed by cooking, and transmission via properly handled and 
prepared pork products is highly unlikely. The outbreak in 
turkeys raises concerns, particularly if birds were to be infected 
with this virus in countries where the Asian strain H5N1 avian 
viruses circulate.
Given the changeability of influenza A viruses, it is certain 
that these viruses will continue to provide surprises. Whether 
the Asian strain H5N1 avian influenza viruses will be among 
those viruses that adapt to new species is still unknown. 
However, surveillance systems and pandemic plans that had 
been established for a potential human pandemic with this 
virus helped ensure a rapid response to the swine-origin 
H1N1 virus. Responses to influenza viruses illustrate how 
good preparedness and awareness of unusual cases can help 
detect a new pathogen, even if its origins are unexpected. 
Information Sources for this chapter can be found at: 
http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/EEDATextbookReferences/
Chapter 5 — Descriptions of Recent Disease Incursions
